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I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) plays a vital public health 
role. It oversees human and animal medical products, food, dietary supplements, 
cosmetics, products that emit radiation, and tobacco—regulating approximately 
25% of the U.S. consumer economy1—and features prominently in many of 
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 1 See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT 2 (2012), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/aboutfda/reportsmanualsforms/reports/ucm298578.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H2C3-ECHQ]. 
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today’s most pressing public health issues, including antimicrobial resistance, 
opioid misuse and overdose, and the death and disease caused by tobacco use. 
Speech, arguably, is integral to the FDA’s regulatory scheme.2 
For example, whether a product meets the definition of a drug or device 
within FDA jurisdiction partly depends on the product’s “intended use,” which 
is defined as the “objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the 
labeling” and is often determined by the manufacturer’s speech about the 
product.3 For products that are within FDA jurisdiction, the agency extensively 
regulates product labeling and, in some cases, advertising.4 Additionally, speech 
regulation may become increasingly intertwined with certain areas of FDA 
regulation as innovative technologies that are designed to interpret and convey 
information—such as genetic tests—blur the boundaries between medical 
products and speech.5 
Perhaps because of the agency’s wide-ranging jurisdiction and that 
jurisdiction’s extensive intersection with speech regulation, food and drug law 
has become a high-profile battleground for commercial speech litigation. In 
particular, the FDA’s position that “off-label” promotion of approved 
prescription drugs—when a manufacturer promotes a drug for a use for which 
the FDA has not approved it—leads to violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) has been subject to successful legal challenges in the last 
several years.6  
                                                                                                                     
 2 See, e.g., Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,943, 
3,943 (May 16, 2002) (“[M]uch of the operation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act . . . depends on the use of words.”). 
 3 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2016); 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 (2017); see 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2012); 
see also Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (declining to find that 
FDA’s use of speech as evidence of an unapproved product’s intended use violates a 
company’s First Amendment rights). In January 2017, the FDA published a final rule 
amending its regulatory definition of intended use, which will go into effect in March 2018. 
The agency, however, is not changing the quoted language. 82 Fed. Reg. 2193, 2217 (Jan. 9, 
2017); 82 Fed. Reg. 14,319, 14,319 (Mar. 20, 2017). 
 4 See, e.g., Krista Hessler Carver, A Global View of the First Amendment Constraints 
on FDA, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151, 164 (2008). 
 5 See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans, The First Amendment Right To Speak About the Human 
Genome, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 549, 551 (2014); Robert C. Green & Nita A. Farahany, 
Regulation: The FDA Is Overcautious on Consumer Genomics, 505 NATURE 286, 286 
(2014); Kayte Spector-Bagdady & Elizabeth Pike, Consuming Genomics: Regulating 
Direct-to-Consumer Genetic and Genomic Information, 92 NEB. L. REV. 677, 728–31 
(2014); see also Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving the Future of 
Personalized Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881, 1897 n.76 (2016) (“In light of recent 
case law, physicians may also seek to use the First Amendment against FDA enforcement 
efforts [with respect to certain diagnostic tests].”). 
 6 The FDA’s policies on off-label promotion of prescription drugs are, by no means, 
the only FDA policies that have been subject to First Amendment challenges. Many other 
aspects of the FDA’s regulatory scheme have also been challenged. See, e.g., Thompson v. 
W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 366 (2002); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 
F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 
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Some commentators view this development as a correction of the FDA’s 
unnecessary and unconstitutional restrictions on industry speech.7 But others 
have argued that courts’ increasing willingness to recognize and expand 
protection for off-label promotion will have harmful public health 
consequences.8 The federal government, and state and local governments, have 
identified troubling—at least in their view—marketing campaigns conducted by 
pharmaceutical companies to promote off-label uses of drugs. Examples include 
promoting antipsychotic drugs for use in older patients with dementia, a 
population in which the use of the drugs is associated with an increased risk of 
death;9 promoting antidepressants for use in adolescents with depression, a 
population in which use of the drugs is associated with an increased risk of 
suicidal thinking and behavior;10 and marketing powerful painkillers, intended 
for managing breakthrough pain in patients with cancer who are opioid tolerant, 
for a broader patient population at a time when the United States is facing an 
epidemic of opioid misuse and overdose.11  
                                                                                                                     
F.3d 509, 520 (6th Cir. 2012); Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1999); All. 
for Nat. Health U.S. v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48, 58 (D.D.C. 2010); Gerald Masoudi & 
Christopher Pruitt, The Food and Drug Administration v. the First Amendment: A Survey of 
Recent FDA Enforcement, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 111, 111 (2011). But the FDA’s policies on 
off-label promotion of prescription drugs provide a particularly high-profile example of an 
area in which First Amendment challenges have recently met with increased success—and, 
because of the public health stakes, an important example. 
 7 See, e.g., Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, 
the FDA and the First Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection, 
37 AM. J.L. & MED. 315, 317 (2011); Anthony J. Anscombe & Mary Beth Buckley, Facteau 
Medical Device Convictions Illustrate FDA’s Unhealthy Control over Off-Label Speech, 
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Washington Legal Found., Washington, D.C.), Oct. 28, 2016, at 4, 
http://www.wlf.org/upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/ 
102816LB_Anscombe.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3QP-CGJL]; cf. Lars Noah, The Little Agency 
that Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 901, 920 (2008) (“[A]t times the FDA has shown a marked indifference to 
constitutional limits on its range of actions.”). 
 8 See, e.g., Joshua M. Sharfstein & Alta Charo, The Promotion of Medical Products in 
the 21st Century: Off-Label Marketing and First Amendment Concerns, 314 JAMA 1795, 
1796 (2015).  
 9 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Eli Lilly and Company Agrees To Pay $1.415 
Billion To Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Zyprexa (Jan. 15, 2009), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2009/January/09-civ-038.html [https://perma.cc/3WG2-
879F]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Johnson & Johnson To Pay More Than $2.2 
Billion To Resolve Criminal and Civil Investigations (Nov. 4, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/johnson-johnson-pay-more-22-billion-resolve-criminal-and-civil-investigations 
[https://perma.cc/MR49-UHRN]. 
 10 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline To Plead Guilty and Pay $3 
Billion To Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure To Report Safety Data (July 2, 2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glaxosmithkline-plead-guilty-and-pay-3-billion-resolve-
fraud-allegations-and-failure-report [https://perma.cc/AZD4-WSTK]. 
 11 See Jessica Huseman, Illinois Sues Controversial Drug Maker over Deceptive 
Marketing Practices, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/ 
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Although all on-label uses of drugs also are associated with risks (and 
sometimes quite serious risks),12 such off-label marketing is troubling to 
regulators and many public health advocates for various reasons. It is well-
established that industry promotion—both to prescribers and directly to 
patients—influences prescribing practices.13 Research also suggests that the 
majority of off-label uses lack strong scientific support, off-label uses not 
supported by strong scientific evidence are associated with significantly higher 
rates of adverse events than on-label uses are, and prescribers are often unaware 
that particular uses are off-label even when the benefits of those uses are 
unsupported.14 Promoting off-label uses, therefore, may inappropriately 
increase prescriptions for off-label uses that have unfavorable, or unacceptably 
uncertain, risk–benefit ratios.15 Indeed, scholars have asserted that the off-label 
promotion of certain products “has led to widespread patient morbidity and 
mortality.”16 Equally important, enabling the promotion of uses that the FDA 
                                                                                                                     
illinois-sues-controversial-drug-maker-over-deceptive-marketing-practices 
[https://perma.cc/4NAM-ZAQD]; Nate Raymond, Insys Agrees To Pay $4.45 Million To 
Resolve Illinois Opioid Lawsuit, REUTERS (Aug. 18, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
us-insys-court/insys-agrees-to-pay-4-45-million-to-resolve-illinois-opioid-lawsuit-
idUSKCN1AY25C [https://perma.cc/UX5U-ULPX];  Understanding the Epidemic, 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/X2E3-23US] (last updated 
Dec. 16, 2016). 
 12 For example, when Zyprexa, one of the antipsychotics promoted for use in older 
patients with dementia, is used on-label for the indications and populations for which it is 
approved, it is associated with serious and potentially fatal risks such as neuroleptic 
malignant syndrome (NMS). See, e.g., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Approved Labeling for 
Zyprexa (Oct. 2016), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2017/ 
020592s068s069,021086s044s045,021253s057s058lbl.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SKU-SR8C].  
 13 See, e.g., Kevin M. Fain & G. Caleb Alexander, Mind the Gap: Understanding the 
Effects of Pharmaceutical Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 52 MED. CARE 291, 292 (2014); 
Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 
283 JAMA 373, 375 (2000).  
 14 See, e.g., Donna T. Chen et al., U.S. Physician Knowledge of the FDA-Approved 
Indications and Evidence Base for Commonly Prescribed Drugs: Results of a National 
Survey, 18 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 1094, 1098 (2009); Tewodros Eguale 
et al., Association of Off-Label Drug Use and Adverse Drug Events in an Adult Population, 
176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 55, 60 (2016) [hereinafter Eguale, Association]; Tewodros 
Eguale et al., Drug, Patient, and Physician Characteristics Associated with Off-Label 
Prescribing in Primary Care, 172 ARCHIVE INTERNAL MED. 781, 781 (2012) 
[hereinafter Eguale, Drug]. 
 15 See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Mandatory Disclaimers on Dietary 
Supplements Do Not Reliably Communicate the Intended Issues, 34 HEALTH AFF. 438, 445 
(2015). 
 16 Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Prospects for Regulation of Off-Label 
Drug Promotion in an Era of Expanding Commercial Speech Protection, 92 N.C. L. REV. 
1539, 1542 (2014) (citing various sources in the medical and scientific literature regarding 
the consequences of the off-label marketing of Vioxx, Avandia, Paxil, and Ketek); see also 
Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and 
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has not approved may eliminate important incentives for companies to study 
those off-label uses—meaning that the scientific evidence needed for 
prescribers (and the public) to understand whether a particular use is appropriate 
is never produced.17  
Notwithstanding these concerns, courts, increasingly, have seemed willing 
to find that the First Amendment protects a broader range of off-label promotion 
than FDA policies have typically permitted. In response, commentators have 
suggested various ways in which public health concerns might be reconciled (or 
not) with the constitutional limits on the FDA’s authority. Some scholars and 
advocates have proposed changes to the FDA’s requirements for product 
marketing to better align agency policies with recent First Amendment decisions 
and make the agency less vulnerable to constitutional challenges.18 Others have 
questioned the assumptions that appear to underlie recent court opinions 
expanding industry’s First Amendment rights, highlighting reasons why courts 
should decline to extend, or should walk back, protections for commercial 
                                                                                                                     
Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 509 (2010) (“[O]ff-
label uses may be overtly dangerous or wasteful . . . . Certain ‘bad’ off-label uses may need 
to be banned.”). 
 17 See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MEMORANDUM: PUBLIC HEALTH INTERESTS AND 
FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO MANUFACTURER COMMUNICATIONS 
REGARDING UNAPPROVED USES OF APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL PRODUCTS 4–5 (Jan. 2017), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2016-N-1149-0040 [https://perma.cc/FTD8-
LRES] [hereinafter FDA MEMO]; Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call 
for Heightened Professional and Government Oversight, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 476, 483 (2009); 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 
719–20 (2005) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Problem]; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in 
Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 345, 347 (2007); see also Erika Lietzan, 
The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 91, 150 (2016) (“[S]ome provisions 
that are viewed as more traditional health-and-safety measures also implement, whether 
intentionally or incidentally, innovation policy.”); W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and 
the Future of Medicine, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1416 n.71 (2016) (discussing the 
“intertwined” goals of ensuring the quality, and incentivizing the innovation, of medical 
algorithms); cf. Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299, 301 (2015) 
(describing the FDA’s role in supporting innovation); Anna B. Laakmann, A Property Theory of 
Medical Innovation, 56 JURIMETRICS 117, 157–58 (2016) (“[M]anufacturers stand to gain little 
from performing risky, rigorous clinical trials to study off-label uses of licensed drugs.”); Jacob 
S. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, 66 DUKE L.J. 845, 851 (2017) (describing 
the lack of incentives for researching “alternative uses to know, patented therapeutics”). 
 18 See, e.g., Ryan Abbott & Ian Ayres, Evidence and Extrapolation: Mechanisms for 
Regulating Off-Label Uses of Drugs and Devices, 64 DUKE L.J. 377, 382 (2014); Alan 
Bennett et al., Back to First Principles: A New Model for the Regulation of Drug Promotion, 
2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 168, 170 (2015); Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 16, at 1574; see 
also Declaration of Scott Gottlieb, M.D. in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 15, Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(No. 15 Civ. 3588(PAE)) (identifying “viable, less speech-restrictive” alternatives to the 
FDA’s off-label promotion policies). 
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speech in this area.19 Possibly most troubling for those concerned about 
expanded protection for commercial speech, as discussed elsewhere in this 
Issue, courts’ recent willingness to recognize First Amendment protection for 
off-label promotion of approved drugs also may logically extend to protecting 
the promotion of unapproved drugs—which would de facto permit their sale, 
undermining the entire premarket approval scheme for new drugs.20  
This Article takes a different approach by exploring potential indirect 
consequences of recently recognized protections for off-label promotion. In 
United States v. Caronia, a high-profile 2012 case regarding off-label 
promotion, Judge Debra Ann Livingston’s dissenting opinion cautioned that the 
majority’s recognition of expanded protections for off-label promotion may 
have indirect effects—by causing the FDA’s approval decisions, which must 
balance a drug’s benefits against its risks, to “become[] very difficult or even 
impossible.”21 This Article argues that, as Judge Livingston suggested, 
protections for off-label promotion indeed might affect the FDA’s decision-
making in areas other than drug promotion, and analyzes precisely what those 
effects could be in light of the FDA’s current statutory authority.  
                                                                                                                     
 19 See, e.g., Micah L. Berman, Manipulative Marketing and the First Amendment, 103 
GEO. L.J. 497, 537 (2015); Christopher Robertson, When Truth Cannot Be Presumed: The 
Regulation of Drug Promotion Under an Expanding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 545, 
554–55 (2014); Spencer Phillips Hey & Aaron S. Kesselheim, An Uninformative Truth: The 
Logic of Amarin’s Off-Label Promotion, PLOS MED., at 1, 4  (Mar. 15, 2016), 
http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001978 
[https://perma.cc/WYB4-8ZWS]; see also David Orentlicher, Off-Label Drug Marketing, 
the First Amendment, and Federalism, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89, 92 (2016) (arguing 
that courts have failed to account for the federalism concerns implicated by FDA regulation 
of off-label use). 
 20 See Christopher T. Robertson, The Tip of the Iceberg: A First Amendment Right to 
Promote Drugs Off-Label, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1019, 1023–24 (2017) [hereinafter Robertson, 
Tip of the Iceberg]; infra Part III.B; see also Nathan Cortez, The Statutory Case Against Off-
Label Promotion, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 124, 126 (2016) (arguing that “the FDCA as a 
whole depends on the ban” on off-label promotion); Christopher Robertson & Aaron S. 
Kesselheim, Regulating Off-Label Promotion—A Critical Test, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2313, 
2315 (2016) (“We fear that these developments could be the beginning of an FDA retreat 
from the FDCA’s fundamental precepts . . . .”); Sharfstein & Charo, supra note 8, at 1795 
(arguing that one company’s off-label promotion lawsuit “challenged the US approach to 
drug regulation”). 
 21 United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 179 (2d Cir. 2012) (Livingston, J., 
dissenting); see also Cortez, supra note 20, at 140 (“Moreover, if the FDA knew that once a 
drug was approved, it could be legally marketed for any use, the agency might weigh the 
benefits and risks less charitably in the first instance.”). As discussed in more detail in infra 
Part IV.A.2, the FDCA requires the FDA, in its approval decisions, to assess whether a “drug 
is safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed 
labeling.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012). Based on this language, therefore, one might argue that 
the FDA cannot consider the risks of off-label uses in its approval decisions. When looking 
at the FDCA as a whole, however, there is also a case to be made that Congress did not intend 
to so limit the FDA. This statutory interpretation question is discussed in more detail in infra 
Part IV.A.2. 
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The FDA, similar to other modern regulators, often relies on what scholars 
have called “information regulation”—“lighter-touch” regulatory tools, such as 
required disclosures or restrictions on marketing, that encourage the desired 
behavior or outcome, rather than directly mandating it through “command-and-
control” tactics.22 But if stripped of the ability to oversee off-label drug 
promotion, the FDA could begin to more strictly regulate the drugs themselves 
or industry’s nonexpressive conduct, to satisfy its statutory obligations to ensure 
that a drug’s benefits outweigh its risks. Moreover, this shift closer to command-
and-control regulation may not be limited to decisions about drugs. Instead, such 
a shift could extend to any FDA decision-making that relies on a benefit–risk 
assessment.23 This Article, therefore, examines potential indirect regulatory 
consequences of broader product promotion for the FDA’s drug regulatory 
scheme, and also begins to explore the consequences for other areas in which 
FDA regulation relies on risk–benefit balancing, using new tobacco products as 
the example through which to undertake this analysis. 
The FDA’s authority to regulate new tobacco products is not the only area, 
other than new drugs, in which expanded protections for product promotion may 
indirectly affect the FDA’s regulatory decisions.24 Most clearly, expanded 
protections for postapproval promotion also may affect the FDA’s regulation of 
devices—products for which FDA policies also prohibit off-label promotion, 
                                                                                                                     
 22 See, e.g., Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 163–64 (2016). 
 23 For some products that the FDA oversees, it does not employ a risk–benefit 
assessment similar to that applied to drugs. For example, the FDA does not generally assess 
the “benefits” of foods and cosmetics—instead, its mission is to help ensure that foods and 
cosmetics are safe and properly labeled. See, e.g., CFSAN—What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/centersoffices/officeoffoods/cfsan/whatwedo/ 
[https://perma.cc/ASR6-U7DU] (last updated Aug. 18, 2016). 
 24 It is also worth noting that, although the FDA is the focus of this Article, it is not the 
only regulator to consider. In particular, states have recently shown interest in regulating 
drugs in ways that challenge the FDA’s policies. See, e.g., Lars Noah, State Affronts to 
Federal Primacy in the Licensure of Pharmaceutical Products, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 3 
(2016); Patricia J. Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 IND. L.J. 845, 847–49 (2017). Off-
label promotion seems ripe to attract the attention of the states. For example, in 2017 Arizona 
enacted a law intended to permit truthful off-label promotion of drugs and devices. See H.R. 
2382, 53d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., sec. 1, § 32-1997(A) (Ariz. 2017). Although Arizona’s law 
demonstrates that it is interested in enacting policies more permissive than the FDA’s, other 
states may be interested in regulating drugs, or drug promotion, more strictly if the FDA 
were to play a diminished role in overseeing drug promotion. Indeed, as one example, states 
have brought lawsuits against opioid manufacturers accusing the companies of engaging in 
fraudulent marketing that downplayed the risks of the drugs and contributed to the opioid 
epidemic. See, e.g., Colin Dwyer, Ohio Sues 5 Major Drug Companies for ‘Fueling Opioid 
Epidemic,’ NPR (May 31, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/05/31/530929307/ohio-sues-5-major-drug-companies-for-fueling-opioid-
epidemic [https://perma.cc/8585-T8G9]; see also Zettler, supra, at 848 (providing examples 
of state efforts to regulate drugs both more stringently and more leniently than the FDA 
does). Thus, just as expanded protections for off-label promotion may have indirect 
consequences for FDA regulation, such protections may likewise have indirect effects on the 
ways that states choose to regulate drugs. 
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and for which premarket authorization generally is based on a product’s safety 
and effectiveness.25 But this Article considers the example of the agency’s new 
tobacco product authority to begin to examine how the indirect effects of 
increased protections for product promotion may extend beyond the context of 
medical products.26 
Ultimately, this Article suggests that, because the FDA regulatory regime is 
a complex, interconnected one, limiting or eliminating FDA oversight of certain 
aspects of product promotion could alter other regulatory decisions, at least at 
the margins.27 Restricting off-label (and other kinds of) product promotion is a 
tool that the agency uses to manage the risks of what are often dangerous 
products.28 Eliminating that tool from the agency’s repertoire could push the 
FDA to look to other—frequently more paternalistic—options, such as product 
gatekeeping or restrictions on product use, to achieve its public health mission. 
This result, in turn, may mean more restrictions on how providers prescribe and 
dispense drugs, and fewer approvals for new drug and new tobacco products—
neither of which is likely to be a desirable outcome. There is, thus, yet another 
reason for stakeholders to be concerned that loosening the FDA’s oversight of 
product promotion will result in unwanted consequences. 
To establish the context for these regulatory consequences, Part II provides 
an account of recent controversies regarding the off-label promotion of 
prescription drugs. Part III considers the reach of recent court decisions 
protecting off-label promotion, and argues that one possible outcome, at least in 
the foreseeable future, is that courts will conclude that the First Amendment 
protects a broader scope of off-label promotion of approved drugs than the FDA 
has historically permitted. Part IV then delves into the ways that the FDA’s 
regulatory regime for drugs may be affected by such expanded protection for 
off-label promotion in two specific areas—agency decisions about whether and 
how to limit the use of new drugs in medical practice, and new drug approvals. 
Part IV also begins to consider how greater protection for product promotion 
may affect the FDA’s regulation of other products for which it weighs risks and 
benefits, such as new tobacco products.  
II. THE OFF-LABEL PROMOTION CONTROVERSY 
To set the stage for considering the potential impact of expanded protections 
for the promotion of FDA-regulated products, this Part explains FDA policies 
on off-label promotion of drugs, and recent challenges to those policies.  
                                                                                                                     
 25 See, e.g., FDA MEMO, supra note 17, at 6–7 (describing the FDA’s policies on off-
label promotion of devices). 
 26 Infra Part IV.B. 
 27 Infra Parts IV and V. 
 28 Cf. FDA MEMO, supra note 17, at 2–3 (explaining that “[t]he separate weighing of 
benefit and risk for each intended use is critical” because evidence supporting safety and 
effectiveness in one context does not necessarily support safety and effectiveness of the same 
product in another context). 
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A. The FDA’s Position on Off-Label Promotion 
The FDA has broad authority over drugs sold in the United States. Under 
the FDCA, whether a product meets the definition of a drug such that it is subject 
to the FDA’s requirements for drugs largely depends on the product’s “intended 
uses.”29 Specifically, a product is a drug if it is “intended for use in the diagnosis, 
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease,” or “intended to affect the 
structure or any function of the body.”30 Thus, the same substance may be a 
drug in some circumstances but not in others. For example, the FDA has 
explained “charcoal is the key ingredient in common products sold as fuel, a use 
outside FDA’s jurisdiction, but charcoal products are drugs when intended for 
emergency treatment of poisoning.”31 And often the best piece of evidence 
demonstrating a product’s intended use—at least for the purpose of determining 
whether a product meets the definition of a drug—is the manufacturer’s 
representations about the product.32  
If a product is determined to be a drug, it is subject to the FDA’s many 
requirements for drugs, including the agency’s premarket approval authority for 
new drugs. New drugs cannot be sold in the United States without the FDA’s 
approval.33 When the FDA approves a drug, it approves that drug for the 
particular uses recommended in the drug’s FDA-approved labeling. That is, the 
FDA approves a drug to treat a particular disease (or a particular stage of a 
disease), in a particular patient population, at a particular dose, and in a 
particular dosage form—all of which is reflected in the FDA-approved 
labeling.34 However, once the drug is approved, medical practitioners generally 
may prescribe the drug for any purpose, including uses not in the drug’s FDA-
approved labeling.35 These uses are described as “off-label.” 
                                                                                                                     
 29 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2016). To be subject to the 
FDA’s jurisdiction, the drug (or its components) must also move in interstate commerce. See 
21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)(1), 331.  
 30 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B)–(C). But not all products that are intended to affect the 
body’s structure or function are medical products. For example, dietary supplements and 
conventional foods may be intended to affect the structure or function of the body in certain 
circumstances. See, e.g., Structure/Function Claims, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/food/ingredientspackaginglabeling/labelingnutrition/ 
ucm2006881.htm#conventional [https://perma.cc/J86F-GH64] (last updated Aug. 2, 2017). 
 31 FDA MEMO, supra note 17, at 2. 
 32 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 201.128; see also Lewis A. Grossman, Food, Drugs, and 
Droods: A Historical Consideration of Definitions and Categories in American Food and 
Drug Law, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1091, 1108 (2008) (“Regulated industries contend that 
intended use is established solely by representations made in labeling, advertising, and other 
promotion. Conversely, the FDA maintains that it can look to the overall circumstances of 
distribution, foreseeable use [and] actual use . . . to determine a product’s intended use.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 33 21 U.S.C. § 355(a). 
 34 See, e.g., Dresser & Frader, supra note 17, at 477.  
 35 See, e.g., DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE 
AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 617 (2010); Patricia J. Zettler, Toward 
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Although practitioners are typically free to prescribe approved drugs off-
label, it has long been the FDA’s position that a drug manufacturer’s promotion 
of unapproved, off-label uses results in violations of the FDCA.36 The FDCA 
does not expressly prohibit off-label promotion.37 But the FDA interprets 
various FDCA provisions and the agency’s implementing regulations such that 
off-label promotion is evidence that a drug is misbranded, and, in some cases, 
unapproved.38 The FDCA prohibits marketing in interstate commerce 
misbranded or unapproved drugs, and both criminal and civil penalties are 
available to the government if a drug manufacturer violates those prohibitions.39  
One statutory rationale for the FDA’s position, in short, is that under the 
FDCA and FDA regulations, if the intended use of an approved drug—as 
evidenced by the drug’s labeling—is an unapproved use, the drug may be an 
unapproved new drug with respect to that off-label use.40 Even though the FDA 
approves certain pieces of a drug’s labeling, off-label promotion can be found 
in a drug’s labeling because “labeling,” as defined in the FDCA and FDA 
regulations, is a broad category.41 It includes both the labeling that the FDA 
approves at the time a drug is approved, as well as many written, printed, or 
graphic promotional materials that the FDA does not approve before 
dissemination, including in some cases websites.42  
Additionally, and more commonly, off-label promotion may be evidence 
that a drug is misbranded in violation of the FDCA. False or misleading off-
label promotion in labeling or advertising misbrands a drug.43 The FDCA also 
deems a drug to be misbranded if any of its labeling lacks “adequate directions” 
for all intended uses.44 Drugs promoted for off-label uses, including through 
oral statements, lack such adequate directions for the unapproved use by 
definition, because their FDA-approved labeling will not include directions for 
the unapproved use.45 Therefore, although off-label promotion itself is not 
expressly prohibited, in the FDA’s view such promotion is evidence that drug 
manufacturers have violated the FDCA. 
                                                                                                                     
Coherent Federal Oversight of Medicine, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 427, 436 n.45 (2015). For 
a discussion of some contexts in which medical practitioners may not prescribe drugs for 
off-label uses, see infra notes 160–61 and accompanying text. 
 36 See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 20, at 124. 
 37 See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 38 For a detailed description of the statutory support for the FDA’s position, see Cortez, 
supra note 20, at 126. 
 39 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 331(d), 333(a) (2012). 
 40 Id. §§ 321(p), 355(a); 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.128, 310.3(h)(4) (2016).  
 41 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(m); Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 350 (1948); 21 
C.F.R. § 202.1(l) (1991). 
 42 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(m); Kordel, 335 U.S. at 350; 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l). 
 43 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(n), 352(a), (n); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(5)(i), (e)(6)(i). 
 44 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1). 
 45 Id.; 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.5, 201.100(c)(1) (2016).  
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B. Challenges to the FDA’s Position 
As courts have expanded protections for commercial speech in general,46 
industry and other stakeholders have used those protections to challenge the 
FDA’s position on off-label promotion.47 This Part sets out the commercial 
speech doctrine that underlies challenges to the FDA’s policies on off-label 
promotion, and explains how the courts have applied that doctrine to the FDA’s 
policies in recent years. 
1. Protections for Commercial Speech 
Scholars point to the 1970s as the beginning of the Supreme Court’s 
recognition that commercial speech is protected under the First Amendment.48 
As the Court explained in 1975 in Bigelow v. Virginia, “[a]dvertising is 
not . . . stripped of all First Amendment protection” because speech that is 
related to “the marketplace of products or of services” is not “valueless in the 
marketplace of ideas.”49 But the Court has also recognized that the First 
                                                                                                                     
 46 See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 762 (1976); see also Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information 
Libertarianism, 105 CAL. L. REV. 335, 352–54 (2017) (describing the debate about 
expanding protections for commercial speech); Kenneth D. Katkin, First Amendment 
Lochnerism? Emerging Constitutional Limitations on Government Regulation of Non-
Speech Economic Activity, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 365, 369 (2006) (describing the deregulatory 
effect of expanding protections for commercial speech); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years 
of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915, 1917, 1925 (2016) (discussing 
“the discourse of ‘First Amendment Lochnerism’”); Shanor, supra note 22, at 135 
(explaining that recent “trends have brought the First Amendment into greater conflict with 
the modern administrative state”); Rebecca Tushnet, Cool Story: Country of Origin Labeling 
and the First Amendment, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 25, 26 (2015) (describing First Amendment 
Lochernism in the context of required country of origin labeling for meat). 
 47 In determining whether speech is “commercial,” courts generally consider whether 
the speech is advertising, whether it discusses a specific product, and whether the speaker 
has economic motivations. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–
67 (1983). Put more succinctly, courts examine whether the speech is “solely related to the 
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 
163 (2d Cir. 2012). As Nathan Cortez has explored, in some circumstances it may be possible 
for speech by FDA-regulated industry to be noncommercial, and thus entitled to heightened 
protection. Nathan Cortez, Can Speech by FDA-Regulated Firms Ever Be Noncommercial?, 
37 AM. J.L. & MED. 388, 390 (2011); see also Jennifer L. Herbst, Off-Label “Promotion” 
May Not Be Merely Commercial Speech, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 43, 73–74 (2015); Joseph 
Leghorn et al., The First Amendment and FDA Restrictions on Off-Label Uses: The Call for 
a New Approach, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 391, 397 (2008). This Article, however, presumes 
that courts will consider off-label promotion to be commercial speech both because that is 
what courts have done, and because the circumstances in which a drug manufacturer’s speech 
might be noncommercial are likely to be limited. See, e.g., Caronia, 703 F.3d at 163; Wash. 
Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 334 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Cortez, supra, at 390. 
 48 See, e.g., Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 16, at 1550.  
 49 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975). 
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Amendment “impos[es] looser constraints when the government seeks to 
restrict . . . commercial speech” than when it seeks to restrict noncommercial 
speech.50 That is, government restrictions on commercial speech are often 
described as subject to “intermediate scrutiny.”51  
In the 1980 case Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission of New York, the Supreme Court articulated a four-part test for 
determining whether a commercial speech regulation survives this intermediate 
scrutiny.52 First, if the regulated speech is false or misleading, or about unlawful 
activity, it does not qualify for protection.53 If, however, “the communication is 
neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity,” the government restriction 
survives judicial review only if the government has a substantial interest at 
stake, the government’s speech restriction directly advances that substantial 
interest, and the government’s restriction is no more extensive than necessary.54  
Although described as intermediate scrutiny, Central Hudson may be an 
increasingly difficult test for the government to satisfy. When courts consider 
mandated disclosures or government counter speech to be viable alternatives to 
directly restricting commercial speech, the government will face difficulty 
satisfying the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test—that the government’s 
regulation be no more extensive than necessary.55 Moreover, some commercial 
speech restrictions may be subject to even more exacting scrutiny than the 
Central Hudson test establishes. In Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., decided in 2011, 
the Supreme Court explained that commercial speech restrictions that are 
“content-based”—meaning the government chooses to regulate the speech 
“because of disagreement with the message it conveys”—are subject to 
“heightened scrutiny.”56 The Court did not further explain what such 
“heightened scrutiny” entails, beyond explaining that the government must at 
least show that it satisfies the Central Hudson test.57 Government restrictions 
on commercial speech that is not false or misleading (or about an illegal 
product), thus, may face skeptical courts, whether those courts apply the 
intermediate scrutiny test from Central Hudson or the “heightened scrutiny” 
envisioned in Sorrell.58  
                                                                                                                     
 50 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 582 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 51 See, e.g., Caronia, 703 F.3d at 163; Berman, supra note 19, at 541. 
 52 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
 53 Id. at 563–64. 
 54 Id. at 564. 
 55 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 19, at 508–09. 
 56 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565–66 (2011). 
 57 Id. at 572. 
 58 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 19, at 508 (“In the years following Central Hudson, 
the test has begun to look more like strict scrutiny . . . .”). 
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2. Recent Applications to the FDA’s Position 
Since first recognizing that the First Amendment protects commercial 
speech in the 1970s, the Supreme Court and lower courts have considered 
commercial speech protections for various types of prescription drug marketing, 
and stakeholders have had success challenging some legal restrictions on drug 
promotion. Some of these successes have come in the context of off-label 
promotion specifically, as when a federal judge concluded that the FDA’s 
conditions under which drug manufacturers could distribute peer-reviewed and 
reference literature on off-label uses violated manufacturers’ First Amendment 
rights.59 And others have come in the context of drug advertising more 
generally, as when the Supreme Court concluded in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. 
that a Vermont law restricting the use of prescriber-identifying information for 
drug marketing “[was] contrary to basic First Amendment principles.”60 
Yet, until recently, these cases did not seem to seriously challenge the 
FDA’s position that off-label promotion leads to violations of the FDCA. 
Indeed, the government continued to successfully bring enforcement actions 
against companies and executives engaged in off-label promotion, often 
obtaining enormous payouts as part of settlements. For example, in 2009, Eli 
Lilly paid approximately $1.4 billion to settle a case involving off-label 
promotion of its antipsychotic drug, Zyprexa, as a treatment for dementia.61 This 
promotion resulted not only in a violation of the FDCA—at least in the 
government’s view—but also involved serious public health concerns. In 
addition to being unproven to be effective for dementia, Zyprexa is associated 
with an increased risk of death when used in elderly patients with dementia-
related psychosis.62 
The landscape for the FDA to enforce its position on off-label promotion, 
however, seems to be changing. Scholars have argued that First Amendment 
jurisprudence is increasingly coming into conflict with the modern regulators’ 
reliance on information regulation rather than command-and-control tactics.63 
Consistent with this trend, in recent years the FDA has faced challenges to its 
position on off-label promotion on several occasions.  
In 2009, the FDA faced a lawsuit that broadly challenged the agency’s de 
facto ban on off-label promotion. The complaint, filed by Allergan, sought a 
decision permitting the company to distribute truthful and non-misleading 
                                                                                                                     
 59 Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 51–52 (D.D.C. 1998), appeal 
dismissed sub nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 332 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 60 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 576; see also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 
373 (2002). 
 61 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 9. 
 62 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 12 (Zyprexa Labeling).  
 63 See, e.g., Shanor, supra note 22, at 134–35; cf. Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise 
Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (2015) (making a similar argument with 
respect to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the free exercise clause of the First 
Amendment). 
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information about the use of Botox for common off-label indications such as 
juvenile cerebral palsy and headaches.64 Notably, regulators in other countries 
had already approved Botox for treating juvenile cerebral palsy,65 and since the 
lawsuit, the FDA has approved Botox for chronic migraines.66 The government, 
however, settled with Allergan in 201067—thereby avoiding the First 
Amendment question.  
A few years later, the FDA was not as fortunate. In 2009, a jury found Alfred 
Caronia, a sales representative for a subsidiary of Jazz Pharmaceuticals (Jazz), 
guilty of a misdemeanor conspiracy to introduce misbranded drugs into 
interstate commerce based on Mr. Caronia’s off-label promotion of Jazz’s 
narcolepsy drug, Xyrem.68 The facts of the case, in some respects, seemed 
sympathetic to the FDA’s position. According to the Second Circuit, Mr. 
Caronia “plainly promoted the use of Xyrem” for “unapproved uses,” ranging 
from insomnia to fibromyalgia to Parkinson’s disease.69 Moreover, despite the 
serious risks associated with Xyrem, including death—for which the FDA had 
required a black box warning and a special risk mitigation program for the 
drug—Mr. Caronia asserted that Xyrem is “a very safe drug.”70  
Nevertheless, in 2012 a two-judge majority of the Second Circuit 
overturned Mr. Caronia’s conviction on First Amendment grounds. As a 
preliminary matter, despite the FDA’s usual position that off-label promotion is 
evidence of a violation of the FDCA rather than a violation in and of itself,71 the 
majority determined that Mr. Caronia was prosecuted for his speech alone.72 
The majority did not consider Mr. Caronia’s speech to be evidence of the drug’s 
intended use because the government’s argument at trial suggested that 
“Caronia’s speech was itself the proscribed conduct.”73 
 The majority then considered the appropriate standard for review. As in 
Sorrell, in which the Supreme Court concluded that Vermont’s restrictions on 
using prescriber-identifying information for drug marketing were content based 
                                                                                                                     
 64 Complaint at 15, Allergan, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:09-cv-01879 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 
2009). 
 65 See, e.g., Lise T. Spacapan & Jill M. Hutchison, Prosecutions of Pharmaceutical 
Companies for Off-Label Marketing: Fueled by Government’s Desire To Modify Corporate 
Conduct or Pursuit of a Lucrative Revenue Stream?, 22 ANNALS HEALTH L. 407, 429 (2013). 
 66 See, e.g., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Approved Labeling for Botox (Apr. 2017), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2017/103000s5302lbl.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U2R5-PMAU]. 
 67 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Allergan Agrees To Plead Guilty and Pay $600 
Million To Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Botox (Sept. 1, 2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/allergan-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-600-million-resolve-
allegations-label-promotion-botox [https://perma.cc/HVM6-JFEN]. 
 68 United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 158–59 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 69 Id. at 156. 
 70 Id. at 157. 
 71 See supra Part III.A. 
 72 Caronia, 703 F.3d at 161–62. 
 73 Id. at 161. 
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and thus subject to “heightened scrutiny,” the majority concluded that 
heightened scrutiny was warranted for Mr. Caronia’s prosecution.74 But the 
majority nevertheless applied the four-part test from Central Hudson because if 
a government action cannot survive intermediate scrutiny under Central 
Hudson, it also cannot survive heightened scrutiny.  
Because the government failed to argue that Mr. Caronia’s statements were 
false or misleading at trial, the majority presumed that his statements were 
truthful and non-misleading, and focused on the last three factors of the Central 
Hudson test.75 Although the majority concluded that the government had a 
substantial interest in protecting the public’s safety and health, it determined 
that prosecuting Mr. Caronia did not directly advance that interest because off-
label prescribing is generally permitted, and, thus, restricting information about 
such prescribing in fact might be detrimental to the public health. Moreover, the 
court identified a number of “less-speech restrictive” regulatory options 
available to the government, including distributing its own views about off-label 
uses, or even prohibiting off-label use itself.76 Accordingly the majority 
concluded that even if Central Hudson’s “less rigorous intermediate test” 
applied to the government’s action, prosecuting Mr. Caronia for his off-label 
speech violated his First Amendment rights.77 
III. CARONIA’S IMPACT 
It is, perhaps, an understatement to say that public health and FDA law 
scholars have identified Caronia as an important ruling.78 But roughly five years 
later, the decision’s impact on FDA oversight is not entirely clear in part because 
the government declined to appeal the decision.79 In the absence of a Supreme 
                                                                                                                     
 74 Id. at 163–64. 
 75 Id. at 166 n.10. There was, however, a strong argument that at least some of Mr. 
Caronia’s statements were false or misleading, and therefore not protected under the First 
Amendment. For example, Mr. Caronia described Xyrem as a “very safe drug.” Id. at 157. 
But Xyrem is associated with serious risks, including the risk of death, and is a Schedule III 
controlled substance that presents a risk of misuse. Id. at 155. Additionally, its sodium salt 
is gamma hydroxybutyrate, or GHB, a Schedule I controlled substance often associated with 
use in sexual assaults. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Approved Labeling for Xyrem (Jan. 2017), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2017/021196s027lbl.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/M77W-4YLM]. 
 76 Caronia, 703 F.3d at 167. 
 77 Id. at 164. 
 78 See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., FDA Regulation of Off-Label Drug Promotion 
Under Attack, 309 JAMA 445, 445 (2013); Wendy Parmet & Peter D. Jacobson, The Courts 
and Public Health: Caught in a Pincer Movement, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 392, 393 (2014); 
Sharfstein & Charo, supra note 8, at 1795. 
 79 Cf. Letter from Richard A. Samp, Chief Counsel, & Mark S. Chenoweth, General 
Counsel, Wash. Legal Found., to Food & Drug Administration 9 (May 19, 2017), 
http://wlf.org/upload/litigation/briefs/FDAComments-IntendedUse.pdf [https://perma.cc/5643-
ZTTN] (noting that “FDA questions the continued vitality of Caronia . . . [b]ut . . . if it 
disagreed with the Second Circuit’s legal analysis, it should have sought review of the 
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Court opinion, stakeholders and commentators have debated and scrutinized 
Caronia’s effect on the FDA’s ability to regulate product promotion. Three 
possible views of Caronia’s impact have emerged.  
A. It Changes Nothing 
One possibility is that Caronia will not lead to meaningful changes in the 
FDA’s regulation of advertising and promotion. Shortly after Caronia was 
decided, the director of the FDA’s Office of Prescription Drug Promotion 
(OPDP) explained that Caronia would not “significantly affect” the agency’s 
off-label promotion policies because the decision did not address the 
constitutionality of using off-label promotion as evidence of intended use, nor 
did it strike down any provisions of the FDCA or FDA regulations.80  
In 2016, in United States ex rel. Polansky v. Pfizer, the Second Circuit 
seemed to partly endorse the OPDP director’s view of the Caronia decision, 
albeit in dictum.81 Polansky was a False Claims Act case that focused on the 
questions of whether a manufacturer engaged in off-label marketing, and, 
through that marketing, improperly induced federal and state health care 
programs to pay for the drug.82 The allegedly off-label promotion involved 
marketing Lipitor, a drug that the FDA approved for lowering cholesterol, for 
that use but for a purportedly inappropriate patient population. The court 
ultimately concluded that Lipitor had not been marketed off-label, but also noted 
in a footnote that “Caronia left open the government’s ability to prove 
misbranding on a theory that promotional speech provides evidence that a drug 
is intended for a use that is not included on the drug’s FDA-approved label.”83 
Consistent with this view, in January 2017 the FDA published a lengthy 
memorandum documenting its public health rationale for its policies on off-
label promotion as well as various arguments that those policies comport with 
the First Amendment.84 Among other things, the memorandum asserted that the 
First Amendment does not prohibit the use of product promotion as evidence of 
intended use.85 The agency cited Polansky, as well as numerous other cases in 
which courts have reached the conclusion that product promotion may be used 
                                                                                                                     
panel’s decision”); Stephanie M. Greene & Lars Noah, Off-Label Drug Promotion and the 
First Amendment, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 239, 248 (2014) (in which Lars Noah notes 
that the government’s decision not to appeal may have reflected concerns “that the Supreme 
Court might take the occasion to put another nail in the coffin of FDA speech regulation”). 
 80 Jill Wechsler, Tom Abrams: Caronia Won’t Stop Off-Label Enforcement, 
PHARMEXEC.COM (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.pharmexec.com/tom-abrams-caronia-wont-
stop-label-enforcement [https://perma.cc/8CJV-FCPA]. As OPDP’s name suggests, it is the 
office within the FDA responsible for overseeing prescription drug advertising and 
promotion. 
 81 United States ex rel. Polansky v. Pfizer, 822 F.3d 613, 615 n.2 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 82 Id. at 614. 
 83 Id. at 615 n.2 (emphasis added). 
 84 See FDA MEMO, supra note 17, at 3. 
 85 See id. at 21–22. 
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to determine whether a wholly unapproved product is a drug subject to relevant 
FDA requirements.86 
Additionally, some courts outside of the Second Circuit have expressly 
declined to follow Caronia. For example, one judge in the Eastern District of 
California explained that the idea that off-label promotion is permissible “has 
gained little traction” in the Ninth Circuit.87 One also might (or might not) point 
to the fact that the FDA has yet to revise its drug promotion regulations,88 and 
the government’s continued ability to settle at least some off-label promotion 
cases for large amounts,89 as evidence that Caronia has not meaningfully 
affected the FDA’s authority in this area, nor will it in the future.90  
                                                                                                                     
 86 Id. at 21–25; see, e.g., Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 87 Hawkins v. Medtronic, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2014); see also 
Ramirez v. Medtronic Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 977, 990 (D. Ariz. 2013) (“Off-label promotion, 
then, violates federal law and may carry criminal penalties.”); cf. Jones v. Medtronic, 89 
F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047 (D. Ariz. 2015) (“Courts differ as to whether ‘off-label’ promotion 
and use violates FDA requirements.”). Just three months after the Second Circuit decided 
Caronia, in United States. v. Harkonen the Ninth Circuit upheld a criminal conviction that 
was based on statements that the former CEO of a drug company made about the results of 
a clinical trial of a new, unapproved use for the company’s approved drug. United States v. 
Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633, 636 (9th Cir. 2013). Harkonen is distinguishable from Caronia 
because the defendant was convicted of wire fraud—meaning that a jury found that his 
speech was false or misleading, and intentionally or knowingly so. See id.; United States v. 
Harkonen, No. C 08-00164 MHP, 2010 WL 2985257, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2010); see 
also Stephanie M. Greene, After Caronia: First Amendment Concerns in Off-Label 
Promotion, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645, 684–89 (2014) (describing Harkonen). Nevertheless, 
some have argued that Harkonen suggests that courts may find limits on the First 
Amendment protections announced in Caronia. See, e.g., Marcia M. Boumil & Kaitlyn L. 
Dunn, Off-Label Marketing of Pharmaceutical Products in the Wake of United States v. 
Caronia and United States v. Harkonen, 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 385, 430–31 (2014). 
 88 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2017). 
 89 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 10; cf. Isaac D. Buck, Side 
Effects: State Anti-Fraud Statutes, Off-Label Marketing, and the Solvable Challenge of 
Causation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2129, 2132–33 (2015) (discussing state efforts to regulate 
off-label promotion through litigation under state consumer protection and fraud laws). 
There are, however, other important reasons that the federal government may have had 
continued success in settling off-label promotion cases. One is the government’s ability to 
exclude individuals and entities convicted of certain criminal violations of the FDCA from 
participation in federal health care programs, such as Medicare. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 
(2012); see also Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813, 817 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (describing the 
government’s authority under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7). With such high stakes, companies and 
executives charged with violations stemming from off-label promotion may be inclined to 
settle regardless of the strength of the government’s legal position, to avoid even a small 
chance of exclusion. 
 90 See Marc J. Scheineson & Guillermo Cuevas, United States v. Caronia: The 
Increasing Strength of Commercial Free Speech and Potential New Emphasis on Classifying 
Off-Label Promotion as “False and Misleading,” 68 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 201, 211 (2013) 
(“When the dust settles from Caronia, the federal government may decide to not 
fundamentally change its compliance posture for off-label promotion.”). 
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B. It Changes Everything 
A second possibility—and the one most concerning for many scholars and 
public health advocates—is that Caronia will be interpreted broadly such that it 
undermines the benefits of the FDA’s premarket approval system, or wholly 
dismantles the system.91 Indeed, one high-ranking FDA official was reportedly 
“horrified” when the Second Circuit decided Caronia in 2012, possibly in 
recognition of the potential for the decision to broadly disrupt drug regulation.92 
As the FDA has explained, permitting broader off-label promotion may 
diminish industry incentives for studying and obtaining approval for new uses 
of drugs.93 This result would be troubling because an important function of FDA 
regulation is to incentivize the production of scientific knowledge about medical 
products.94  
The fears that the entire drug approval system will be undermined stem from 
concerns that Caronia will be interpreted to significantly limit, or eliminate 
altogether, the FDA’s ability to rely on off-label promotion as evidence of 
violations of the FDCA. As Robertson argues in his article in this Issue, such an 
interpretation of Caronia could extend to the promotion of unapproved drugs, 
including obviously ineffective and fraudulent products.95 That is, if courts 
extend Caronia to conclude that product promotion cannot be evidence of 
intended use in the postapproval context, courts logically could conclude that 
product promotion, likewise, cannot be evidence of intended use in the 
preapproval context.96 This would present a significant obstacle to the FDA 
regulation of drugs because often the FDA uses the manufacturer’s speech to 
demonstrate that the product falls within the definition of a drug—meaning the 
product is intended to address disease or affect the structure or function of the 
body—and the government alleges that the manufacturer has violated the law 
by selling an unapproved new drug.97 Thus, if courts were to extend Caronia to 
                                                                                                                     
 91 See, e.g., Robertson, Tip of the Iceberg, supra note 20, at 1023–26. 
 92 Brenda Sandburg, Off-Label Ruling’s Potential Fallout Is “Terrifying,” FDA’s 
Temple Says, THE PINK SHEET, Dec. 17, 2012, at 1. 
 93 Declaration of Janet Woodcock, M.D. at ¶¶ 4–6, Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. FDA, 
119 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y 2015) (No. 15 Civ. 3588); FDA MEMO, supra note 17, at 14; 
see also Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 69 (D.D.C. 1998) (describing 
“providing manufacturers with ample incentive to get previously unapproved uses on label” 
as one government interest in regulating off-label promotion). 
 94 See, e.g., FDA MEMO, supra note 17, at 18; Eisenberg, Problem, supra note 17, at 
719, 725. 
 95 Robertson, Tip of the Iceberg, supra note 20, at 1040–44. 
 96 See id. at 1042; see also Cortez, supra note 20, at 140 (explaining that eliminating 
the prohibition on off-label use “would also draw into question not only the century-old 
intended use doctrine, but also the very definitions of ‘drug’ and ‘device,’ which also depend 
on intent”). 
 97 See, e.g., Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 948–49 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Cole, 84 F. Supp. 3d 1159, 1163 (D. Or. 2015). A drug’s intended use is also critical 
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the unapproved products context, the FDA may not be able to enforce 
requirements for premarket approval, essentially eliminating the FDA’s 
gatekeeping role for drugs.98 And that result would also reach far beyond the 
FDA context, disrupting other regulatory regimes that rely on speech as 
evidence of intent.99 
That said, none of the decisions following Caronia—in the Second Circuit 
or elsewhere—have extended Caronia to unapproved products.100 There may 
be practical reasons for this. As Robertson notes in his article, even if the logic 
of Caronia can extend quite far, “courts can and do draw arbitrary lines.”101 
Although the FDA frequently relies on speech as evidence in cases regarding 
wholly unapproved drugs, courts may be disinclined to extend Caronia’s 
rationale to that context because it is expressly stated in the FDCA that selling 
unapproved new drugs is illegal.102 Given the explicit statutory prohibition, it 
may be easier for courts to agree with the FDA’s argument that the agency is 
prohibiting the conduct of selling an unapproved drug—not the promotional 
speech—and is simply using the speech as evidence that the product is a new 
drug under the law.103 Although it is the FDA’s position that selling approved 
drugs that have been promoted for off-label uses likewise is conduct that 
violates the FDCA—and there is a strong argument supporting the agency’s 
                                                                                                                     
to demonstrating that the product is a “new drug” subject to the requirements for premarket 
approval. See Whitaker, 353 F.3d at 950. 
 98 See Robertson, Tip of the Iceberg, supra note 20, at 1051–52. 
 99 See id. at 1025. 
 100 See, e.g., id. at 1028–30. 
 101 Id. at 1051. 
 102 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012); see also United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935, 939 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (distinguishing off-label promotion and the sale of unapproved devices). 
 103 There are times when the government proceeds against the manufacturer of a wholly 
unapproved drug on the theory that the company is violating the law by selling a misbranded 
or adulterated, rather than an unapproved, drug. For example, the FDA has jurisdiction over 
a drug only when it (or its components) move in interstate commerce. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g), 
331. This limitation on the FDA’s authority is rarely relevant because modern product 
production generally involves at least product components crossing state and international 
borders. But in a case that involved an unapproved autologous stem cell therapy, one issue 
was whether, and when, the product had traveled in interstate commerce such that the FDA 
had jurisdiction over it. See United States v. Regenerative Scis., LLC, 741 F.3d 1314, 1320 
(D.C. Cir. 2014). The FDA has more flexibility in finding evidence of the needed nexus with 
interstate commerce for misbranded and adulterated drugs than it does for unapproved drugs. 
See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a), (c), (k). Thus, in the case of this unapproved stem cell therapy, the 
evidence supporting the government’s allegations of misbranding and adulteration violations 
was likely stronger than the evidence that would have supported allegations of unapproved 
drug violations. And, in fact, the government’s theory was that the stem cell therapy was 
misbranded and adulterated. See, e.g., Regenerative Scis., 741 F.3d at 1318. But even when 
the government proceeds against the manufacturer of a wholly unapproved new drug on a 
theory that the drug is misbranded or adulterated, courts have been willing to accept company 
statements as evidence of intended use, see, e.g., id.—perhaps because it is well-accepted 
that unapproved new drugs violate the law, even if the government’s theory does not rely on 
a lack of approval.  
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position104—it is a much more nuanced statutory interpretation argument than a 
claim that selling wholly unapproved new drugs violates the law. Because of the 
complicated statutory interpretation underlying the FDA’s position on off-label 
promotion, it may be more difficult for the government to persuade judges and 
juries that selling products that are promoted off-label is illegal conduct and off-
label promotion is being used solely as evidence as intent.  
C. It Changes Some Things 
Because courts, thus far, have declined to extend Caronia to the context of 
unapproved products, a third possibility, and perhaps the most likely scenario 
for the foreseeable future, is that Caronia will affect FDA oversight by 
broadening product promotion, but only for FDA-approved products. There are 
some practical signs that Caronia has made the FDA cautious in its regulation 
of prescription drug advertising and promotion without completely halting 
enforcement. For example, the FDA sent relatively few warning and untitled 
letters regarding prescription drug promotion in recent years—sending only 9 in 
2014,105 9 in 2015,106 and 11 in 2016,107 compared with 31 in 2011,108 the year 
before Caronia was decided, 51 in 2010,109 and 41 in 2009.110 Although there 
                                                                                                                     
 104 See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 20, at 129. 
 105 Warning Letters 2014, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://wayback.archive-
it.org/7993/20170111082153/http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryI
nformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPh
armaceuticalCompanies/ucm380323.htm#DDMAC [https://perma.cc/W2YG-QDU2] (last 
updated July 9, 2016). 
 106 Warning Letters 2015, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ 
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLetter
sandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/ucm432949.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9BSZ-UW3X] (last updated Aug. 9, 2017). 
 107 Warning Letters 2016, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ 
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLetter
sandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/ucm482462.htm 
[https://perma.cc/NU3E-85YN] (last updated Aug. 9, 2017). 
 108 Warning Letters 2011, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://wayback.archive-it.org/ 
7993/20170111082210/http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInform
ation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmac
euticalCompanies/ucm238583.htm [https://perma.cc/8WGX-QNL5] (last updated Mar. 14, 
2016). 
 109 Warning Letters 2010, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://wayback.archive-it.org/ 
7993/20170111082214/http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInform
ation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmac
euticalCompanies/ucm197224.htm [https://perma.cc/U2FQ-HSEN] (last updated Mar. 5,  
2015) (letters sent from the Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and Communications). 
 110 Warning Letters 2009, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://wayback.archive-
it.org/7993/20170111082216/http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryI
nformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPh
armaceuticalCompanies/ucm055773.htm [https://perma.cc/7N8N-EGN9] (last updated  
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are many reasons why the FDA may have sent fewer letters in this area in the 
last several years, one possibility is that the FDA is currently exercising its 
enforcement powers conservatively to avoid First Amendment challenges.111  
Additionally, the agency has made public that it is in the process of re-
examining its off-label promotion policies. The FDA hosted a public meeting in 
November 2016 to obtain input on off-label promotion,112 at which commenters 
raised constitutional questions about the agency’s policies.113 The agency then 
published a sixty-three page memo detailing its public health interests in 
regulating off-label promotion and its current view of the First Amendment 
caselaw to provide additional information for interested stakeholders and solicit 
more public input.114  
Although it is not yet clear what result the agency’s re-examination of its 
own policies will have, several cases that followed Caronia also suggest that the 
protections announced in Caronia may provide an avenue for broader 
promotion of approved products. In Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, a federal 
judge in the Southern District of New York (which, notably, is in the Second 
Circuit), relied on Caronia to enjoin the FDA from prohibiting Amarin from 
engaging in “truthful and non-misleading speech promoting the off-label use of 
[its drug] Vascepa.”115 The FDA approved Vascepa in 2012 to reduce 
triglyceride levels in adults with severe hypertriglyceridemia, a risk factor for 
coronary artery disease.116 Amarin then sought FDA approval for use in a 
broader patient population—patients with triglyceride levels that were 
persistently high, but did not amount to severe hypertriglyceridemia. The FDA 
denied approval for the broader indication, and in its letter to the company, 
reminded Amarin that Vascepa “may be considered to be misbranded” under 
the FDCA if marketed for the sought-after, but still unapproved, indication.117 
Amarin then went to court to seek an injunction that would prevent the FDA 
from prohibiting the company from making “truthful and non-misleading” off-
label statements about Vascepa.118 Finding for Amarin, the federal judge 
concluded that the FDA may not bring an enforcement action based solely on 
truthful promotion about an approved drug.119 The FDA then settled with 
                                                                                                                     
Mar. 28, 2016) (letters sent from the Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and 
Communications). 
 111 See, e.g., Patricia J. Zettler, Regulating Drug Promotion To Promote the Public 
Health: A Response to Bennett et al., 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 712, 714 (2015). 
 112 Public Hearing, 81 Fed. Reg. 60,299 (Sept. 1, 2016). 
 113 FDA MEMO, supra note 17, at 21. 
 114 John T. Aquino, Off-Label Drug Promotion Could Happen if Stakeholders Agree, 
BLOOMBERG BNA: HEALTH CARE BLOG (May 12, 2017), https://www.bna.com/offlabel-
drug-promotion-b73014450900/ [https://perma.cc/T2WP-CM9Z].  
 115 Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 116 Id. at 209. 
 117 See id. at 212. 
 118 Id. at 212, 215. 
 119 Id. at 237. 
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Amarin, agreeing, among other things, not to appeal the decision.120 
Additionally, several months after the Amarin decision, the agency settled 
another off-label promotion lawsuit brought in New York by Pacira 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.121  
The FDA’s decision to settle with Amarin and Pacira indicates that Caronia, 
in fact, is affecting FDA regulation of off-label promotion. These settlements 
suggest that the agency was not confident in its ability to prevail in further 
litigation, at least in the Second Circuit. But that Caronia is binding only in the 
Second Circuit does not necessarily significantly limit its impact. Amarin and 
Pacira demonstrate that, whenever the FDA threatens to enforce its de facto 
prohibition on off-label marketing, companies may elect to file a complaint 
seeking an injunction in a federal court in the Second Circuit, which will be 
bound by Caronia.122 Additionally, several district courts outside of the Second 
Circuit have followed Caronia’s reasoning to conclude that truthful, non-
misleading off-label promotion about approved products is permissible, which 
suggests that Caronia may be persuasive in other jurisdictions.123 Accordingly, 
as a practical matter, Caronia—combined with Amarin, Pacira, and the other 
subsequent cases suggesting that Caronia was not a fluke—may substantively 
change the pharmaceutical industry’s advertising and promotion strategies.  
                                                                                                                     
 120 See, e.g., Eric Palmer, With FDA Settlement, Tiny Amarin Creates Opening for 
Pharma in Off-Label Marketing, FIERCEPHARMA (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.fiercepharma 
.com/pharma/fda-settlement-tiny-amarin-creates-opening-for-pharma-off-label-marketing 
[https://perma.cc/ZDP3-EPXW]. 
 121 See, e.g., Alan Bennett et al., Affirming the Need for a New Model for the Regulation 
of Drug Promotion: A Rebuttal to Krause and Zettler, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 192, 193 (2016), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5033428/ [https://perma.cc/WE72-M63Z]. 
 122 See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Can FDA Tell a Drug Company To Stop Talking About 
Research?, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Aug. 13, 2015), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/ 
wordpress/can-fda-tell-a-drug-company-to-stop-talking-about-research/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4VN6-G2CR]. 
 123 See, e.g., Dawson v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-663-JFA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
112877, at *17 (D.S.C. Aug. 9, 2013) (“[F]or any of these claims to survive the instant 
motion to dismiss, the court must accept Plaintiff’s premise that off-label promotion is illegal 
under the FDCA, and this court cannot do so.”); see also United States v. Facteau, No. 1:15-
cr-10076, 2016 WL 4445741, at *2 n.1 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2016) (jury acquitting two 
medical device executives of felony fraud and FDCA violations based on off-label 
promotion); Final Jury Instruction at 12, United States v. Vascular Sols., Inc., 181 
F. Supp. 3d 342 (W.D. Tex. 2016) (No. 5:14-CR-00926) (instructing the jury that off-label 
promotion of a device is “not illegal”); Robertson & Kesselheim, supra note 20, at 2314 
(discussing Facteau); David L. Rosen et al., How Will FDA Regulate Off-Label 
Communications in the Post-Facteau World?, Article in Food and Drug Policy Forum, FOOD 
& DRUG L. INST. (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.fdli.org/2016/09/will-fda-regulate-off-label-
communications-post-facteau-world/ [https://perma.cc/JZ3U-4X4V] (discussing Vascular 
Solutions and Facteau). 
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One might note that the circumstances of Caronia, Amarin, and Pacira (and 
Allergan) may have been unusually unfavorable for the FDA.124 As already 
noted, in Caronia the government failed to argue that the speech at issue was 
false or misleading. Amarin, likewise, involved unusual circumstances.125 The 
active ingredient in Vascepa is icosapent ethyl, which is an omega-3 fatty acid 
similar to an ingredient in fish oil products that are marketed as dietary 
supplements.126 Those supplements may be legally marketed to persons without 
severe hypertriglyceridemia,127 and the inconsistent treatment of the products—
even though required by the differing regulatory regimes that Congress has 
established for drugs and dietary supplements—seemed not to sit well with the 
deciding judge.128 Pacira similarly involved a potentially uncommon situation 
in which one contested issue was what the label encompassed—meaning the 
dispute between the company and the agency focused in part on whether the 
promotion was on- or off-label.129  
Amarin and Pacira also pre-dated the Second Circuit’s Polansky opinion, 
in which the court commented that Caronia does not foreclose the possibility 
that the government could use off-label promotion as evidence of intended use 
needed to prove a violation of the FDCA.130 But in Polansky, the Second Circuit 
concluded that off-label promotion had not taken place—meaning it did not 
address the circumstances of Amarin and Pacira, nor did it decide the question 
of when off-label promotion may, or may not, be used as evidence of violations 
of the FDCA.131 Moreover, the Second Circuit seemed to endorse a definition 
of off-label promotion that may be narrower than the FDA’s definition.132 The 
court identified a “distinction” between promoting a drug for diseases and 
conditions for which it is unapproved, and promoting a drug for its approved 
purpose but to populations “neither specified nor excluded in the label.”133 The 
FDA may not draw a similar distinction.134 Thus, it is not clear how helpful 
                                                                                                                     
 124 In Allergan, as noted above, the company sought assurances that it could market 
Botox off-label for numerous indications including some that were either approved in other 
countries or ultimately approved by the FDA. Complaint at 16–17, Allergan, Inc., v. United 
States, No: 1.09-cv-01879 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 1, 2009).  
 125 Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 126 Id. at 209. 
 127 Id. at 228–29. 
 128 See id. 
 129 Complaint at 4–5, Pacira Pharms., Inc. v. U.S. FDA, No. 1:15-cv-0755 (S.D.N.Y. 
filed Sept. 8, 2015). 
 130 United States ex rel. Polansky v. Pfizer, Inc., 822 F.3d 613, 615 n.2 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 131 Id. at 620. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 The FDA’s view is that promoting a drug for an unapproved patient population 
constitutes off-label promotion. See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 20, at 124 (“Off-label use can 
range from conspicuous (prescribing a product for an unapproved medical condition or 
patient group) to more subtle (prescribing beyond the approved dosage, duration, or any 
other parameter set forth in the approved labeling).”). But at issue in Polansky was whether 
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Polansky would have been for the government, had it been decided before 
Amarin and Pacira. Taken together, Caronia and subsequent cases seem to have 
affected the extent to which the FDA can enforce its policies on off-label 
promotion, at least in certain circumstances,135 leading to the possibility for 
broader promotion of approved drugs than the FDA has historically permitted.  
IV. EXPLORING INDIRECT CONSEQUENCES 
Even if protections for off-label promotion are limited to claims about 
approved products, we are likely to see broader prescription drug promotion 
than the FDA has historically tolerated. However courts define what constitutes 
“truthful and non-misleading” claims about approved prescription drugs, and 
however the FDA may revise its promotion policies, the result is likely to be 
one that permits a wider range of promotion.136 One question that Caronia, thus, 
raises is how broader drug promotion might change other areas of FDA 
regulation under its existing authority, particularly in ways that may not be as 
vulnerable to First Amendment challenges.137 And because First Amendment 
protections for drug promotion are likely to also apply to other products within 
the FDA’s jurisdiction, this question is not limited to prescription drug 
regulation. Instead, such indirect effects might occur in any area in which the 
FDA weighs risks and benefits and in which broader product promotion can 
alter that balance of risks and benefits.  
This Part takes up the question of what Caronia and its progeny’s indirect 
effects may be, arguing that limiting the FDA’s ability to regulate product 
promotion may increase the risks of the products and thus alter the way that the 
FDA implements its authorities that are linked to a weighing of risks and 
benefits.138 It first explores the possible indirect consequences of Caronia on 
                                                                                                                     
the drug, in fact, was promoted for an unapproved patient population, with the court 
ultimately concluding it was not so promoted. Polansky, 822 F.3d at 620. Therefore, it is not 
entirely clear whether the court meant to define off-label promotion more narrowly than the 
FDA does. 
 135 See, e.g., Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015) (rejecting the FDA’s interpretation of Caronia as “a mere artifact of that case’s 
particular facts and circumstances”). 
 136 See, e.g., Hey & Kesselheim, supra note 19, at 1; see also Joan H. Krause, Truth, 
Falsity, and Fraud: Off-Label Drug Settlements and the Future of the Civil False Claims 
Act, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 401, 403 (2016) (“If pharmaceutical manufacturers are 
emboldened by Caronia to challenge [off-label] FCA prosecutions, . . . the resulting 
litigation is likely to focus on the truth or falsity of the company’s statements . . . .”). 
 137 Cf. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 179 (2d Cir. 2012) (Livingston, J., 
dissenting). 
 138 To be clear, this Part does not analyze a comprehensive list of potential regulatory 
consequences of broader product promotion. For example, this Part does not discuss device 
regulation in detail. As another example, the FDA might choose to require that product 
promotion include certain warnings. Such a requirement, however, would be compelled 
speech vulnerable to First Amendment challenges. See, e.g., Micah L. Berman, Clarifying 
Standards for Compelled Commercial Speech, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 53, 54 (2016). As 
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the regulation of new drugs, and specifically on the FDA’s risk mitigation and 
approval authorities. This Part then begins to consider areas other than new 
drugs in which Caronia may also affect the FDA’s decision-making, focusing 
on the FDA’s approval authority for new tobacco products as an example of 
how Caronia’s impact may extend even beyond the context of medical products.  
A. The FDA’s Regulation of New Drugs 
This Part considers the consequences of expanded protection for off-label 
promotion for the FDA regulation of new prescription drugs, suggesting that it 
may lead to the FDA more frequently requiring risk mitigation programs for 
drugs and to the agency approaching approval decisions more conservatively.139 
To make this argument, it is helpful to first understand why off-label promotion 
                                                                                                                     
a third example, the majority opinion in Caronia suggested that the FDA might choose to 
increase its own publicity efforts to counter any industry communications that are 
problematic in the agency’s view. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 168. Indeed, the FDA clearly has the 
authority to communicate about the products that it regulates. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 375(b) 
(2012); Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era, 
2011 BYU L. REV. 1371, 1375, 1385 (2011); NATHAN CORTEZ, AGENCY PUBLICITY IN THE 
INTERNET ERA 32 (Sept. 2015), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
agency-publicity-in-the-internet-era.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AAY-WYK7]  
[hereinafter Cortez Report] (Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States). 
It, however, is difficult to imagine that agency publicity could cure relevant public health 
concerns associated with broader industry promotion. The drug and tobacco industry spend 
an immense amount of money on advertising, with the drug industry spending approximate 
$27 billion per year and the tobacco industry (excluding e-cigarette and other electronic 
nicotine delivery system (ENDS) companies) spending approximately $9.5 billion per year. 
Persuading the Prescribers: Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing and Its Influence on 
Physicians and Patients, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Nov. 11, 2013), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2013/11/11/persuading-the-
prescribers-pharmaceutical-industry-marketing-and-its-influence-on-physicians-and-
patients [https://perma.cc/7Z72-K7XM]; Tobacco Industry Marketing, CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/tobacco 
_industry/marketing/ [https://perma.cc/B56Y-WGQ8] (last updated Dec. 19, 2016). Each 
number dwarfs the FDA’s entire budget—which was $4.9 billion in 2016. U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., FY 2016 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET (Feb. 2015), https://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM432650.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H8SZ-FWD3]. Particularly when information about risk is nuanced, as will 
often be the case for new drug and ENDS products, it is difficult to imagine that financially 
limited FDA publicity could overcome messages in sophisticated industry marketing with 
far greater resources behind it. 
 139 Cf. FDA MEMO, supra note 17, at 2 (“The separate weighing of benefit and risk for 
each intended use is critical because evidence establishing effectiveness in one 
setting . . . does not establish effectiveness of the same product in another setting . . . .”). 
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poses public health concerns. Put simply, one reason is that off-label promotion 
may increase the risks of a drug.140  
Some off-label uses are medically important, as the FDA itself has 
acknowledged.141 For instance, off-label uses are important for certain 
subpopulations, such as children and pregnant women, because relatively few 
drugs are studied in, and approved for, those groups.142 And in some areas of 
medicine, such as oncology, off-label uses of drugs may be the standard of care 
in part because the research moves more quickly than the FDA approval process 
can and the drugs may be particularly likely to be effective against more than 
the one type of cancer.143 
Nevertheless, broad off-label promotion can pose significant public health 
concerns. Research suggests that, even with the current limits on off-label 
promotion, over 70% of off-label prescriptions are for uses that lack strong 
scientific support.144 Such uses generally are associated with significantly 
                                                                                                                     
 140 For a full discussion of the FDA’s public health concerns regarding off-label 
promotion, see FDA MEMO, supra note 17, at 4–5. 
 141 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: DISTRIBUTING SCIENTIFIC 
AND MEDICAL PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES—RECOMMENDED PRACTICES 6 
(Feb. 2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation 
/guidances/ucm387652.pdf [https://perma.cc/37ND-W5SQ] [hereinafter REPRINT GUIDANCE]; 
cf. Efthimios Parasidis, Patients over Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the 
Regulation of Medical Products, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 929, 985 (2011) (“Although drugs are 
widely prescribed for off-label indications and such uses are generally regarded as necessary 
to treat various health concerns, information related to the safety and effectiveness of off-
label uses is limited and has not undergone FDA scrutiny.”). Of course, even if some off-
label uses are medically valuable, such uses are not likely to be widespread if insurers will 
not pay for them. But insurers do often pay for off-label uses for various reasons. As one 
example, federal law requires Medicare to pay for many drugs used off-label to treat cancer. 
See, e.g., Recent Developments in Medicare Coverage of Off-Label Cancer Therapies, 5 J. 
ONCOLOGY PRAC. 18, 18 (2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2790627/ 
 [https://perma.cc/J6LY-KVXM]. 
 142 See, e.g., Dominique Leveque, Off-Label Use of Anticancer Drug, 9 LANCET 
ONCOLOGY 1102, 1103 (2008); Annie Drapkin Lyerly et al., Pregnancy and Clinical 
Research, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 53. 
 143 See, e.g., Amy P. Abernethy et al., Systematic Review: Reliability of Compendia 
Methods for Off-Label Oncology Indications, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 336, 336 (2009); 
Off-Label Drug Use in Cancer Treatment, NAT’L CANCER INST. (Jan. 1, 2014), 
https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/treatment/drugs/off-label [https://perma.cc/HZ3T- 
XXGW]. 
 144 See supra Eguale, Association, note 14, at 176; supra Eguale, Drug, note 14, at 783; 
David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1023 (2006); see also Barbara J. Evans, What Will It Take 
To Reap the Clinical Benefits of Pharmacogenomics?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 753, 785 (2006) 
(noting that “there may be a public health need to restrict some off-label uses of targeted 
therapies and TAB tests”). Despite the lack of strong evidence to support many off-label 
uses, insurers may pay for such off-label prescriptions, likely for several reasons, including 
that it can be difficult for insurers to distinguish between supported and unsupported off-
label uses, and between off-label and on-label uses. See, e.g., Abbott & Ayres, supra note 
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higher rates of adverse events than on-label uses, and physicians often are 
unaware that particular drug uses are off-label even when those uses lack 
scientific support.145 Additionally, many of the FDA’s off-label-related 
enforcement actions have revealed concerning conduct in which drug 
companies have promoted risky off-label uses.146 Assuming that off-label 
promotion effectively increases off-label prescribing,147 such promotion, thus, 
may cause an increase in these riskier uses of drugs. 
Because there is debate about what are, in fact, truthful and non-misleading 
statements about drugs, limiting protections to what courts determine to be 
truthful and non-misleading claims is not likely to address such public health 
concerns about off-label promotion.148 Courts may be willing to conclude that 
truthful and non-misleading promotion, in at least some circumstances, includes 
promotion about uses that lack significant scientific support. Amarin provides 
an example. Amarin sought to market Vascepta for lowering triglyceride levels 
in patients without severe hypertriglyceridemia with a statement that Vascepa 
“may reduce the risk of coronary heart disease.”149 But several clinical trials 
conducted to study the link between lowering lipid levels and lowering the risk 
of cardiovascular disease were inconclusive.150 Despite the lack of scientific 
support for asserting that a link between lowering lipid levels and the risk of 
cardiovascular disease exists, a federal judge concluded that Amarin’s statement 
was permissible truthful and non-misleading promotion.151 And Amarin’s claim 
about Vascepta is, of course, technically true—absent definitive evidence, we 
could say that anything may, or may not, be linked with a reduction in 
cardiovascular disease.152 The claim, however, in fact may be misleading, given 
that many likely understand the claim to be more definitive than it literally is, 
                                                                                                                     
18, at 392 (“Private insurers have attempted to restrict [off-label prescribing] by arguing that 
such prescriptions are not ‘medically necessary,’ but this tactic has met with limited 
success.”); Joshua Cohen et al., Off-Label Use Reimbursement, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 391, 
400 (2009) (describing the results of a 2009 study of insurers’ policies on reimbursing off-
label uses); cf. Rachel Sachs, Administering Health Innovation, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 23) (on file with author) (describing the relative lack of 
information sharing between the FDA and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
on drug reimbursement). 
 145 See, e.g., Donna T. Chen et al., U.S. Physician Knowledge of the FDA-Approved 
Indications and Evidence Base for Commonly Prescribed Drugs: Results of a National 
Survey, 18 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 1094, 1094–99 (2009); Evans supra 
note 144, at 768. 
 146 See, e.g., supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text. 
 147 It seems fair to make this assumption. After all, increasing off-label uses of drugs is 
likely to be one, if not the only goal, of a company’s off-label promotion, and research has 
demonstrated that drug promotion influences prescribing practices. See, e.g., Wazana, supra 
note 13, at 375. 
 148 See, e.g., Hey & Kesselheim, supra note 19, at 3.  
 149 See id. at 2. 
 150 See id. 
 151 Id.  
 152 Id. 
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and at the very least, the claim is uninformative.153 This result in Amarin 
demonstrates how what courts deem to be “truthful and non-misleading” 
promotion may nevertheless include promotion about uses of drugs that lack 
strong scientific support—and are likely to be riskier.154  
The question, then, is how the FDA might address increased risks associated 
with drugs that are marketed off-label. This Part explores a few ways that the 
FDA could attempt to mitigate increased promotion-related risks of drugs, 
focusing on the FDA’s authority to require Risk Evaluation and Mitigation 
Strategies (REMS) and its approval authority. In short, increased risks of drugs 
may alter the way that the FDA implements these authorities, possibly leading 
to undesirable policy consequences by restricting access to drugs or removing 
them from the market. 
1. Regulating the Practice of Medicine Through REMS 
In Caronia, the majority opinion noted that “less-speech restrictive” 
regulatory alternatives available to the FDA included “prohibit[ing] off-label 
use altogether” or capping the number of off-label prescriptions that physicians 
may write.155 As others have argued, these suggestions seem “ludicrous” for 
several reasons.156 With limited exceptions, the FDA generally does not have 
the statutory authority to directly regulate prescribing practices157 and has faced 
vigorous political opposition when it has been perceived as wading into medical 
practice oversight.158 Moreover, as already noted, the FDA recognizes that some 
                                                                                                                     
 153 Id. 
 154 Cf. Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 16, at 1588 (“[E]ven when a . . . document 
supporting a claim about the safety . . . of an off-label use is offered, it may convey only a 
slice of the full empirical picture.”). 
 155 United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 156 Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 16, at 1596. 
 157 See, e.g., id. at 1595 (“[D]irect regulation of the practice of medicine is outside the 
FDA’s jurisdiction.”); see also Lewis Grossman, Drugs, Biologics, and Devices: FDA 
Regulation, Intellectual Property, and Medical Products in the American Healthcare System, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 637 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2016) 
(describing the FDA’s indirect regulation of medical practice); Lars Noah, Ambivalent 
Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 
149, 173 (2004) (“[T]he FDA undoubtedly affects the practice of medicine, even if only 
indirectly.”); Zettler, supra note 35, at 460–64 (describing the FDA as indirectly regulating 
medical practice). But see 21 U.S.C. § 333(e) (2012) (expressly prohibiting off-label use of 
Human Growth Hormone). 
 158 One example of political opposition to FDA regulation of medical practice comes 
from the history of the 1962 amendments to the FDCA. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. 
No. 87-781, § 102(c), 76 Stat. 780, 781 (1962). The 1962 amendments gave the FDA 
authority to require that drugs be shown to be effective as well as safe. Id. This requirement 
for demonstrating effectiveness was opposed by the American Medical Association and 
others on the ground that it would interfere with physicians’ individualized decisions about 
what treatments were in their patients’ best interests. Zettler, supra note 35, at 475.  
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off-label uses are medically valuable.159 Thus, it is nearly impossible to imagine 
that the FDA would broadly prohibit all off-label uses (or cap the number of off-
label prescriptions a provider may write, which would do nothing to distinguish 
supported and unsupported uses), even if it had express statutory authority to do 
so. 
But restrictions on off-label use are not unprecedented. Examples of federal 
limits on off-label use include the FDCA’s prohibition on off-label prescribing 
of Human Growth Hormone (HGH) and the Controlled Substances Act’s 
prohibition on prescribing certain controlled substances for “maintenance 
treatment” unless those drugs are approved for that indication.160 States have 
also limited off-label prescribing of certain drugs through legislation and 
regulation, consistent with states’ long-recognized authority to regulate medical 
practice pursuant to their police powers.161 
And it is not impossible to imagine that if—or when—expanded off-label 
promotion (and use) leads to increased risks associated with drugs, the FDA 
would make greater use of its authority to indirectly regulate medical practice 
through requiring Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) for 
prescription drugs.162 REMS are, essentially, special risk mitigation programs 
for drugs that the FDA can require drug manufacturers to implement and that 
go beyond including warnings or other information in a drug’s FDA-approved 
labeling.163 The REMS may include, among other things, tools known as 
“elements to assure safe use” that require manufacturers to ensure that drug 
prescribers or dispensers have special training (e.g., about the risks of misuse 
and overdose associated with controlled substances), that the drug is dispensed 
only in certain settings (e.g., only in a hospital inpatient setting), or that certain 
tests results are documented before a drug is dispensed (e.g., a negative 
pregnancy test for a drug known to cause birth defects).164 Although the FDA 
has not explicitly used REMS to prohibit all off-label uses of a drug, some 
REMS appear to significantly restrict off-label uses, or at least make them more 
                                                                                                                     
 159 See, e.g., REPRINT GUIDANCE, supra note 141, at 6. 
 160 Zettler, supra note 35, at 456. 
 161 Id. at 446; cf. Lars Noah, State Affronts to Federal Primacy in the Licensure of 
Pharmaceutical Products, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 3 (2016) (describing numerous state 
efforts to regulate drugs, sometimes through medical practice laws). 
 162 Cf. Margaret Foster Riley, An Unfulfilled Promise: Changes Needed to the Drug 
Approval Process To Make Personalized Medicine a Reality, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 289, 308 
(2015) (“In 2007, [the Food & Drug Administration Amendments Act] introduced 
potentially far-reaching limits on the practice of medicine doctrine allowing FDA to impose 
restrictions (e.g. place and mode of use) on approved drugs . . . .”); Sandburg, supra note 92, 
at 4 (quoting Scott Gottlieb—who was confirmed as the FDA Commissioner in May 2017—
as predicting that limiting FDA regulation of off-label promotion could lead to greater 
agency regulation of medical practice); Zettler, supra note 35, at 464, 498 (describing the 
FDA’s REMS authority as indirectly regulating medical practice). 
 163 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(d)–(f) (2012). 
 164 Id. § 355-1(f)(3). 
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difficult.165 For example, the REMS for Entereg—a drug approved to accelerate 
recovery after certain bowel resection surgeries166—requires the manufacturer 
to ensure that Entereg is only “dispensed in a hospital in patient [sic] setting that 
performs bowel resection surgery,” thereby limiting the ability of providers to 
utilize this drug for off-label uses.167 In this way, although it is drug 
manufacturers and not health care providers that are responsible for complying 
with REMS requirements, the FDA, nevertheless, can indirectly regulate off-
label uses.168 
The FDCA authorizes the FDA to require a REMS when the agency 
determines that one is necessary to ensure that the benefits of a drug outweigh 
its risks.169 To the extent that broader off-label promotion and greater off-label 
use increase the risks of a drug, it, thus, is logical that the FDA would more 
frequently determine that a REMS is necessary to ensure a favorable benefit–
risk ratio. In fact, in determining whether to require a REMS, the FDCA seems 
to broadly authorize the FDA to consider the risks of all off-label use in its 
REMS decisions. Specifically, the FDCA provides that the FDA should 
consider “any known or potential adverse events that may be related to the drug” 
without requiring an association with an on-label use.170 Additionally, the 
FDCA includes in its definition of adverse drug experiences relevant to the 
FDA’s REMS decision-making off-label uses—such as “abuse” and 
“overdose . . . whether accidental or intentional,” as well as any adverse drug 
event “occurring in the course of the use of the drug in professional practice.”171  
Consistent with this language, the FDA has required REMS that aim to 
mitigate risks associated with off-label uses of drugs, including risks posed to 
individuals who are not prescribed the drug. For instance, one purpose of the 
REMS for transmucosal immediate release fentanyl products, which are 
powerful painkillers, is to “[prevent] accidental exposure to children and others 
for whom [the drugs are] not prescribed.”172 As another example, the goal of 
                                                                                                                     
 165 See, e.g., Scott Gottlieb, Drug Safety Proposals and the Intrusion of Federal 
Regulation into Patient Freedom and Medical Practice, 26 HEALTH AFF. 664, 672 (2007).  
 166 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Approved Labeling for Entereg (Oct. 2013), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2013/021775s010lbl.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4SKU-SR8C]. 
 167 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy 
(REMS) for Entereg (alvimopan) at 3 (June 2016), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ 
drugsatfda_docs/rems/Entereg_2016-06-01_REMS_document.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8C2-
P4TC] (database updated June 2016). 
 168 See, e.g., Evans, supra note 16, at 521; Zettler, supra note 35, at 460–66.  
 169 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a) (2012). 
 170 Id. § 355-1(a)(1)(E). 
 171 Id. § 355-1(b)(1). 
 172 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy 
(REMS) for Transmucosal Immediate Release Fentanyl (TIRF) at 2 (Aug. 2017), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/rems/TIRF_2017-09-07_Full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LK2L-UQAD]. TIRF products are intended to be used for managing 
breakthrough pain in opioid-tolerant cancer patients and come in a variety of forms, 
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REMS for Juxtapid, a cholesterol-lowering medication approved for patients 
with an inherited form of high cholesterol known as homozygous familial 
hypercholesterolemia (HoFH), is to mitigate the risk of serious liver injury 
associated with the drug.173 To accomplish this goal, the REMS aims to ensure 
that “JUXTAPID is dispensed only to patients with a clinical or laboratory 
diagnosis consistent with” HoFH; that is, the REMS appears intended to 
discourage off-label use of the drug in patient populations for which the benefit–
risk ratio may not be favorable.174 
If broader product promotion increases risky off-label uses, it, therefore, 
would be consistent with the FDCA and the FDA’s previous decisions for the 
FDA to more frequently require REMS to address those risky uses. Indeed, an 
increase in the agency’s use of REMS may be just what the Caronia majority 
envisioned (although not precisely in those terms)—rather than regulate drug 
manufacturers’ speech to address risks of off-label promotion, the agency ought 
to more strictly regulate the products themselves, or the prescribing and 
dispensing of the products. This, in some views, is what the First Amendment 
requires.  
But the FDA already requires REMS relatively often—according to the 
Generic Pharmaceutical Association, the agency requires REMS for about 40% 
of the novel drugs that it approves175—and greater use of REMS (or greater use 
of the most restrictive elements in REMS) does not come without trade-offs. For 
instance, more REMS programs may create more opportunities for 
anticompetitive behavior. The FDA, lawmakers, and scholars have expressed 
concern that manufacturers of branded drugs use REMS to delay generic 
                                                                                                                     
including sublingual tablets and lozenges, which may increase the risk of accidental exposure 
to children. Id. at 4. 
 173 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy 
(REMS) for Juxtapid (lomitapide) (Mar. 2017), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda 
_docs/rems/Juxtapid_2017-03-02_REMS_Document.pdf [https://perma.cc/TA6Q-5PLR]. 
 174 See id.; see also Evans, supra note 16, at 520 (describing the effect of the 
mifepristone REMS on those patients seeking access for an off-label use). 
 175 Alex Brill, Lost Prescription Drug Savings from Use of REMS Programs To Delay 
Generic Market Entry 1 (July 2014), http://www.gphaonline.org/media/cms/REMS_ 
Studyfinal_July2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HY3-P4PA]. 
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competition in various ways.176 As one example,177 to obtain FDA approval of 
a generic drug, a company must demonstrate that the generic drug is 
bioequivalent to the branded version—and to conduct the necessary studies to 
make that showing, the generic company needs samples of the branded drug.178 
Branded manufacturers reportedly have used REMS-required restrictions on a 
drug’s distribution to deny a potential generic competitor access to samples of 
the drug, thereby making the bioequivalence testing necessary for FDA approval 
impossible.179 As another example, the default under the FDCA is that 
manufacturers of branded and generic versions of the same drug will use a 
single, shared system to implement the REMS for that drug.180 Branded 
manufacturers might drag out negotiations over that shared system, which 
delays the market entry of generic versions that cannot be sold until the REMS 
is in place.181 Particularly at a time when exorbitant drug prices are a significant 
policy concern,182 relying more heavily on REMS—thereby possibly decreasing 
                                                                                                                     
 176 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Sharing, Samples, and Generics: An Antitrust 
Framework, 103 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 1), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2979565 [https://perma.cc/Z4KD-3JCM]; 
Erika Lietzan, A Second Look at the CREATES Act: What’s Not Being Said, 17 FEDERALIST 
SOC’Y REV. 38, 39 (2016); Jordan Paradise, REMS as a Competitive Tactic: Is Big Pharma 
Hijacking Drug Access and Patient Safety?, 15 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 43, 47 (2015); 
Ameet Sarpatwari et al., Using a Drug-Safety Tool To Prevent Competition, 370 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1476, 1476–77 (2014); Scott Gottlieb, FDA Working To Lift Barriers to Generic 
Drug Competition, FDA VOICE (June 21, 2017), https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2017 
/06/fda-working-to-lift-barriers-to-generic-drug-competition/ [https://perma.cc/XS2K-4YFD]. 
 177 For a full discussion of the ways that REMS might be used to thwart potential generic 
competition, see generally Carrier, supra note 176; Lietzan, supra note 176; Paradise, supra 
note 176; and Sarpatwari et al., supra note 176. 
 178 See, e.g., Paradise, supra note 176, at 47–50. 
 179 See, e.g., Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 14-2094, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
182222, at 12–13 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2014); Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Gilead Scis., Inc., Civ. No. 
14-3247 (DWF/JSM), 2015 WL 5718398, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2015); In re Thalomid 
& Revlimid, No. 14-6997, 2015 WL 9589217, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015); Complaint at ¶¶ 
2–4, Actelion Pharm. Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc, Civ. No. 05743 (D.N.J. filed Sept. 14, 2012); see 
also Lannett Co. v. Celgene Corp., No. 08-3920, 2011 WL 1193912, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 
29, 2011) (involving similar claims related to FDA-required restricted distribution systems 
that predated the agency’s REMS authority). Efforts to prevent potential generic competitors 
from accessing branded drug samples are not limited to those drugs subject to a REMS. 
Manufacturers of branded drug samples may voluntarily restrict distribution of their product, 
or attempt to make access to samples difficult through contractual arrangements with 
distributors. See, e.g., Lietzan, supra note 176, at 45; Gottlieb, supra note 176. 
 180 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(i)(1)(B) (2012). 
 181 See, e.g., In re Suboxone, No. 2445, 2017 WL 36371, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2017); 
In re Suboxone, 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 687 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
 182 See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the 
United States: Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 859 (2016); Rachel E. 
Sachs et al., Innovative Contracting for Pharmaceuticals and Medicaid’s Best-Price Rule, 
43 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. (forthcoming Feb. 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
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generic competition that can lower drug prices—may not be the optimal way to 
mitigate concerns about risky off-label uses.183  
Beyond issues of competition and drug pricing, REMS may also involve 
trade-offs in medical care. Although REMS can be valuable tools for mitigating 
the risks of drugs, they also may impose burdens on patient access as well as the 
health care system more generally. Congress recognized this possibility, and 
required that REMS have elements to assure safe use “not be unduly 
burdensome on patient access” and “to the extent practicable . . . minimize the 
burden on the health care delivery system.”184 If the FDA must more frequently 
rely on its REMS authority, rather than its off-label promotion policies, to 
mitigate the risks of off-label uses, patients, health care providers, and health 
care systems are likely to bear more of the load of that risk mitigation work.185  
Relatedly, increased use of REMS would mean greater FDA involvement 
with the regulation of medical practice. States have long been viewed as the 
primary regulators of medical practice.186 But there is no constitutional bar on 
the FDA regulating in this space—the federal government could regulate 
medical practice under its commerce (and other) powers.187 Additionally, given 
the FDA’s express authority to require REMS, there is no statutory obstacle to 
increased FDA involvement in medical practice through REMS.188 Indeed, 
courts have upheld FDA actions that, arguably, regulated medical practice, so 
long as the agency was acting within its statutory authority,189 and FDA, or other 
federal, regulation of medical practice may be warranted in certain 
circumstances.190 But heavier use of REMS, nevertheless, may lead to concerns 
about supplanting medical practitioners’ judgments with those of the agency. 
Although the agency’s assessment of how a drug should be used may be correct 
from a population health perspective, it may limit medical practitioners’ 
                                                                                                                     
id=2959939 [https://perma.cc/R334-6V43]; Patricia J. Zettler & Erin C. Fuse Brown, The 
Challenge of Paying for Cost-Effective Cures, 23 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 62, 62 (2017). 
 183 The Generic Pharmaceutical Association—which, of course, is not an unbiased 
stakeholder—estimates that the use of REMS to delay generic competition has increased 
pharmaceutical spending by over $5 billion per year. See Brill, supra note 175, at 1. 
 184 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(2)(C)–(D) (2012); see also Evans, supra note 16, at 520 
(“Congress was aware that REMS use restrictions could create problems of this sort.”). 
 185 Cf. Evans, supra note 16, at 515 (“[T]here are complaints that REMS will ‘make drug 
lifecycle management more complex, more costly, and resource intensive.’”). 
 186 See, e.g., id. at 500–01; Zettler, supra note 35, at 434.  
 187 See, e.g., Evans, supra note 16; Noah, supra note 157, at 191–92; Orentlicher, supra 
note 19, at 100; Zettler, supra note 35, at 467.  
 188 See, e.g., Zettler, supra note 24, at 874; Zettler, supra note 35, at 462. 
 189 See, e.g., United States v. Kaplan, 836 F.3d 1199, 1204, 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(affirming the FDA’s enforcement action against a doctor who reused needles labeled for 
single-use, on the theory the needles were adulterated); United States v. Regenerative Scis., 
LLC, 741 F.3d 1314, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (affirming an injunction against practitioners 
who provided autologous stem cell treatments in violation of the FDCA); see also Zettler, 
supra note 24, at 886 (discussing the ways in which the distinction between medical practice 
and medical products regulation is blurred). 
 190 See, e.g., Zettler, supra note 35, at 487–88.  
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discretion in individual cases in a clinically meaningful way.191 Particularly 
when patients may increasingly seek autonomy over their health care decisions 
and desire more choices in their medical care,192 influencing clinical care based 
on a public health policy goal, rather than an individual patient’s best interests, 
may be politically challenging.193  
2. Approval 
 In addition to increasing the prevalence of REMS, broader off-label 
promotion may have the effect of making the standard for new drug approval 
more difficult to satisfy, at least for marginal drugs.194 New drugs may not be 
sold in the United States until the FDA approves them as safe and effective, and 
the FDA may withdraw approval of a previously approved drug if it no longer 
meets that approval standard (among other reasons).195 The FDA has long 
interpreted the safety and effectiveness standard for drug approval to mean that 
a drug’s benefits outweigh its risks.196 To help ensure that the benefits of a drug 
outweigh its risks, the FDA can take a number of steps to monitor and mitigate 
a drug’s risks post-approval, including requiring warnings in a drug’s labeling, 
patient-specific labeling known as medication guides, postapproval studies and 
clinical trials, and REMS (as discussed above).197 The agency also conducts 
ongoing monitoring of the safety of approved drugs through an active 
postmarket risk assessment system and reported adverse events.198 FDA 
restrictions on prescription drug promotion, including on off-label promotion, 
are another tool for the agency to mitigate the risks of a drug.199 The FDA’s 
policies on drug promotion are intended, among other things, to help ensure that 
accurate information is disseminated for safe use of the drugs.200 Thus, if the 
                                                                                                                     
 191 See, e.g., id. 
 192 See, e.g., Lewis A. Grossman, FDA and the Rise of the Empowered Consumer, 66 
ADMIN. L. REV. 627, 675 (2014). 
 193 See, e.g., Zettler, supra note 35, at 487–88.  
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drugs. 
 195 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (d), (e) (2012). Generic drugs subject to an abbreviated new drug 
application (ANDA) are approved under a different standard based on the generic drug’s 
similarity to the relevant branded drug. See id. § 355(j). 
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 200 Id. 
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FDA’s ability to oversee drug promotion is significantly limited, that may affect 
how the agency views a drug’s safety for the purpose of weighing its risks and 
benefits in approval decisions. 
Of course, whether broader off-label promotion, in fact, could affect the 
FDA’s approval decisions depends on whether the FDCA permits the FDA to 
deny (or withdraw) approval based on the risks associated with off-label uses. 
One might argue that the FDCA does not authorize the FDA to consider the 
risks of off-label use in these decisions. This is because the statute provides that 
the FDA will approve a drug when, among other things, the manufacturer shows 
that the “drug is safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or 
suggested in the proposed labeling.”201  
Although the statutory interpretation question deserves a deeper analysis 
than this Article can provide, it is worth noting that this statutory language 
cannot be considered in a vacuum, divorced from the rest of the FDCA. 
Considering the current language of the FDCA as a whole,202 there are strong 
signs that Congress did not intend the FDA to limit its evaluation of a drug’s 
safety to risks associated with on-label uses, including in the context of approval 
and withdrawal decisions.203 
 One example comes from the requirements for reporting safety-related 
information to the agency. As part of a new drug application, a company must 
submit, “full reports of investigations which have been made to show whether 
or not [a] drug is safe for use,”204 and after approval companies must also submit 
to the agency “adverse drug experience information.”205 Neither reporting 
requirement is limited to information about the risks of on-label uses.206 That 
information about the risks of off-label uses is required to be submitted suggests 
that the FDA ought to use that information in its benefit–risk evaluations. 
As another example, the changes to the FDCA made in the recently enacted 
21st Century Cures Act further bolster the argument that Congress generally 
                                                                                                                     
 201 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (emphasis added); see also Am. Pharm. Ass’n v. Mathews, 530 
F.2d 1054, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (McGowan, J., concurring) (arguing, based on 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(d), that “methadone is safe for its intended use notwithstanding the possibility that it 
will be employed in unintended fashions”). 
 202 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 167–69 (2012) (describing the “whole act” canon of statutory interpretation). 
 203 See NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE, PAIN 
MANAGEMENT AND THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: BALANCING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS 
AND RISKS OF PRESCRIPTION OPIOID USE 6–17 to –21 (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 
prepublication copy 2017) [hereinafter NAS REPORT] (describing the broad “public health 
dimensions” of the FDA’s regulation of drugs, including its approval and withdrawal 
decisions); see also Richard J. Bonnie et al., Both Urgency and Balance Needed in 
Addressing Opioid Epidemic: A Report from the National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine, 318 JAMA 423, 423–24 (2017) (describing a “comprehensive 
approach” for opioid approval decisions). 
 204 21 U.S.C. § 355(b). 
 205 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a), (c) (2015). 
 206 21 U.S.C. § 355(b); 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a), (c). 
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intends the FDA to consider a broad range of evidence in its approval decisions. 
The 21st Century Cures Act explicitly authorizes the agency to consider “real 
world evidence” and “patient experience data” in certain approval decisions.207 
Both of these are forms of evidence that may include information on uses that 
deviate from those recommended in a drug’s current or proposed labeling. 
As a final example, as discussed in Part IV.A.1., Congress has authorized 
the FDA to consider the risks of off-label uses for the purpose of requiring a 
REMS.208 A REMS may be required when necessary to ensure that the benefits 
of a drug outweigh its risks.209 In other words, the FDA may require a REMS 
when necessary to ensure that a drug satisfies the approval standard.210 It, 
therefore, may be illogical to conclude that Congress intended the FDA to 
consider the risks of off-label uses when requiring REMS, but not when making 
approval decisions—particularly in light of the other evidence that Congress 
may not have intended to so limit the FDA.211  
Moreover, as a practical matter, the FDA appears to consider the risks of 
off-label uses as part of its benefit–risk evaluations for approvals and 
withdrawals, at least in certain circumstances. In discussing the FDA’s role in 
addressing the opioid crisis, the FDA Commissioner and the director of the 
FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research explained that, “[w]henever 
FDA assesses the benefits and risks of a product, it must make certain that its 
decision making is based on all of the available information.”212 For approval 
and withdrawal decisions about opioids, this means that the FDA must consider 
how opioids are actually used, including when that use deviates from the FDA-
approved labeling.213  
Although opioid misuse and overdose is a particularly pressing and high-
profile public health problem that may make it an unusual case, the FDA also 
seems to have considered the risks of off-label uses in its approval and 
withdrawal decisions in other contexts. One example is a 2011 FDA action on 
acetaminophen, an active ingredient in many prescription painkillers, such as 
Vicodin, and over-the-counter painkillers, such as Tylenol.214 Acetaminophen 
is associated with a risk of serious liver injury and is a leading cause of acute 
                                                                                                                     
 207 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, §§ 3001, 3022, 130 Stat. 1033, 1083, 
1096 (2016). 
 208 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1)(E), (b)(1). 
 209 Id. § 355-1(a). 
 210 See, e.g., Lietzan, supra note 176, at 42 (“[T]he agency may require a REMS only if 
the drug would not be approvable without the REMS in place.”). 
 211 Cf. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509, 527 (1989) (declining to 
read a statutory provision literally when doing so would result in “odd” or “absurd” results); 
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 202, at 234 (describing the “avoiding absurdity” canon of 
statutory interpretation).  
 212 Scott Gottlieb & Janet Woodcock, Marshaling FDA Benefit-Risk Expertise To 
Address the Current Opioid Abuse Epidemic, 318 JAMA 421, 421 (2017) (emphasis added).  
 213 See id. 
 214 See NAS REPORT, supra note 203, at 6–20 to –21. 
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liver failure in the United States.215 After many years of attempting to address 
the risk of liver damage associated with acetaminophen through other means, 
the FDA published a Federal Register Notice announcing that the FDA would 
withdraw approval of prescription acetaminophen products with more than 325 
milligrams of the ingredient in a dosage unit (e.g., pill) if manufacturers did not 
voluntarily lower the amount of acetaminophen.216 The agency’s rationale for 
this withdrawal decision included the agency’s concerns about the risks 
associated with patients taking more acetaminophen than recommended in the 
drug’s labeling.217  
It, therefore, seems plausible that if the FDA anticipates that unsupported 
off-label uses will be more widely promoted and more widely prescribed, that 
may change the agency’s benefit–risk calculus at the time of approval.218 
Imagine, for example, a drug that is demonstrated to be highly effective for 
weight loss, but also is associated with rare, but serious and even fatal, 
cardiovascular risks. Despite such serious risks, the benefits of such a drug 
might outweigh the risks for patients with obesity or severe obesity, because of 
the serious health risks associated with the conditions themselves.219 But it also 
seems likely that an effective weight loss drug—even one associated with 
serious risks—would be appealing to many individuals, including those without 
obesity, because of cultural pressures to be thin. The FDA might be less likely 
to approve such a drug, even with a REMS, knowing it could be promoted off-
                                                                                                                     
 215 Prescription Drug Products Containing Acetaminophen; Actions To Reduce Liver 
Injury from Unintentional Overdose, 76 Fed. Reg. 2691, 2691 (Jan. 14, 2011). 
 216 Id. at 2692. FDA’s previous attempts to address the problem included working with 
the National Association of State Boards of Pharmacy to more clearly label prescription 
medications that contain acetaminophen, a 2002 advisory committee meeting regarding 
over-the-counter (OTC) acetaminophen products, a patient-education campaign launched in 
2004, an internal working group on acetaminophen started in 2007, changes to OTC drug 
labeling required in 2009, and another advisory committee meeting in 2009 focused on both 
OTC and prescription products. Id. at 2692–94. 
 217 Id. at 2692. 
 218 Cf. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 179 (2d Cir. 2012) (Livingston, J., 
dissenting) (“[A]llowing drug manufacturers to promote off-label uses would undermine the 
FDA’s approval process for not only new uses of pre-approved drugs, but also for entirely 
new drugs.”); United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Yet if a 
manufacturer’s promise to the FDA to avoid speech about off-label uses is unenforceable, 
the FDA may respond by withholding any approval of drugs or devices that have 
questionable additional uses.”). As a practical matter, this change in the agency’s risk–
benefit assessment might increase the amount, or change the kind, of data that the FDA views 
as necessary to satisfy the approval standard, which, de facto, may make the standard more 
difficult to meet. Cf. NAS REPORT, supra note 203, at 6–26 to –32 (recommending that the 
FDA consider a broad range of data in its approval decisions regarding opioids, including 
data about unapproved uses). 
 219 See, e.g., Adult Obesity Causes & Consequences, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/obesity/adult/causes.html [https://perma.cc/ 
C95B-4FE3] (discussing obesity as a serious health issue associated with an increased risk of 
various conditions such as heart disease and certain types of cancer). 
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label, albeit “truthfully.” Indeed, the FDA has explained that “[t]he separate 
weighing of benefit and risk for each intended use is critical” for the agency’s 
approval decisions.220  
Making this scenario more convincing, the agency is not likely to be able to 
effectively mitigate its concerns about off-label promotion by obtaining 
commitments not to market from companies at the time of approval. Even in 
areas without First Amendment concerns, the FDA has faced challenges 
enforcing approval conditions once a product is on the market. For example, 
questions have been raised about the FDA’s ability to enforce postmarket 
studies and clinical trials of drugs that the agency required or drug companies 
committed to conduct, and similar concerns have been raised about the 
enforcement of REMS requirements.221  
Relatedly, we might see an increase in the FDA withdrawing drug 
approvals. The FDA rarely uses its authority to formally withdraw approval of 
a new drug,222 likely for various reasons. These include that withdrawing 
approval is “not normally desirable if some patients [a]re benefitting from the 
drug despite its risks”223 and, as noted above, the FDA is authorized to require 
a number of less drastic means of mitigating drug risks after approval such as 
requiring REMS and warnings on drug labeling.224 Additionally, the FDA does 
not often need to rely on its formal withdrawal authority because companies 
often voluntarily stop marketing drugs when faced with serious safety and 
effectiveness concerns.225 Nevertheless, if broader off-label promotion does 
                                                                                                                     
 220 FDA MEMO, supra note 17, at 2–3.  
 221 See Kevin Fain et al., The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act and 
Postmarketing Commitments, 310 JAMA 202, 202–03 (2013); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-04-11-00510, FDA LACKS COMPREHENSIVE 
DATA TO DETERMINE WHETHER RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES IMPROVE 
DRUG SAFETY 14–22 (Feb. 2013), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-04-11-00510.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RGM3-T863]. 
 222 Cf. Kurt R. Karst, How Often Are Drugs Withdrawn for Safety or Effectiveness 
Reasons (and How Many)? Not Too Often in Recent Years, but There Is a Tranche of 
Withdrawals Historically, HYMAN, PHELPS & MCNAMARA, P.C.: FDA LAW BLOG (June 14, 
2015), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2015/06/how-often-are-
drugs-withdrawn-for-safety-or-effectiveness-reasons-and-how-many-not-too-often-in-
rece.html [https://perma.cc/3TWU-76WA] (finding that approximately 5% of the time that 
companies discontinue marketing brand-name drugs that generic companies seek to copy, 
FDA determines that it was for reasons of safety or effectiveness and withdraws approval of 
the application). 
 223 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SAFETY LABELING 
CHANGES–IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 505(O)(4) OF THE FD&C ACT 3 (July 2013), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances
/ucm250783.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NNK-MB7G]. 
 224 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(o)(4), 355-1(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 225 See, e.g., FDA Public Health Advisory: Safety of Vioxx, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
(Sept. 30, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationfor 
PatientsandProviders/ucm106274.htm [https://perma.cc/PS45-5A2D] (explaining that Merck 
voluntarily withdrew Vioxx from the market because of cardiovascular risks). 
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increase the risks of drugs, we might expect to see the FDA more frequently 
withdrawing approval of drugs, if its other risk mitigation tools prove 
unsuccessful. Again, imagine the effective weight loss drug associated with 
serious cardiovascular risks. Given its benefits for patients with obesity or 
severe obesity, a more plausible scenario than the FDA denying approval, might 
be the FDA withdrawing approval if, after marketing, it becomes apparent that 
the drug’s risks, including the risks of off-label use, outweigh its benefits.  
To be clear, there is debate about whether the FDA’s current 
implementation of the approval standard strikes the right balance, with some 
researchers and commentators raising concerns that the FDA’s approval 
standard is too lenient,226 and others arguing that the FDA’s standard for 
approval is too stringent.227 This Article does not attempt to enter that debate. 
Rather, this Article suggests that whatever the appropriate interpretation of the 
drug approval standard is, increased protections for off-label promotion may 
make it more difficult for the FDA to implement that interpretation of the 
approval standard by removing one tool for the agency to mitigate a drug’s risks 
after approval.  
Additionally, regardless of whether the mechanism would be fewer 
approvals or more withdrawals after approval (or both), as with REMS such an 
outcome does not come without trade-offs. The practical result of fewer 
approvals or more withdrawals, of course, would be that there are fewer 
approved drugs available for patients. This result is undesirable for various 
reasons, including that patients who might otherwise have had available 
                                                                                                                     
 226 See, e.g., Chul Kim & Vinay Prasad, Strength of Validation for Surrogate Endpoints 
Used in the US Food and Drug Administration’s Approval of Oncology Drugs, 91 MAYO 
CLINIC PROC. 713, 723 (2016); David Gorski, Donald Trump Versus the FDA: Is the 
Standard of Evidence for Drug Approval Actually Too Low Rather than Too High?, 
SCIENCE-BASED MED. (Feb. 6, 2017), https://sciencebasedmedicine.org/donald-trump-versus-
the-fda-part-2/ [https://perma.cc/WGE3-QWLF]; Matthew Herper, The FDA Is Basically 
Approving Everything. Here’s the Data To Prove It, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2015), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2015/08/20/the-fda-is-basically-approving-
everything-heres-the-data-to-prove-it/#65b42fb45e0a [https://perma.cc/X9YS-9C8R]; see 
also Nicholas S. Downing et al., Clinical Trial Evidence Supporting FDA Approval of Novel 
Therapeutic Agents, 2005–2012, 311 JAMA 368, 368–69 (2014) (finding that the quality of 
the evidence supporting drug approvals varies widely); Nicholas S. Downing et al., 
Postmarket Safety Events Among Novel Therapeutics Approved by the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration Between 2001 and 2010, 317 JAMA 1854, 1854 (2017) (finding that roughly 
one-third of novel drugs approved by the FDA were associated with significant postmarket 
safety concerns). 
 227 See, e.g., Robert Kocher & Bryan Roberts, The Calculus of Cures, 370 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1473, 1474 (2014); Leah Isakov et al., Is the FDA Too Conservative or Too 
Aggressive?: A Bayesian Decision Analysis of Clinical Trial Design 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 21499, 2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2641547 [https://perma.cc/E42D-
XDPM]; cf. Patricia J. Zettler & Henry T. Greely, The Strange Allure of State “Right-To-
Try Laws,” 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1885, 1885 (2014) (describing the debate around 
terminally and seriously ill patients’ access to unapproved drugs). 
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treatments—or more treatment choices—will not have them, and fewer drug 
approvals (or more withdrawals) may, in some instances, lead to less 
competition and higher drug prices.228  
There may also be other, less obvious, trade-offs to consider. For example, 
there may be transparency concerns about shifting more risk management to 
drug approval decisions because there, arguably, is little oversight of FDA 
decisions not to approve drugs. Companies rarely, if ever, challenge those 
decisions in court, and the FDA’s letter explaining its reasons for denying 
approval—known as a “Complete Response Letter”—generally is not publicly 
available under current FDA policies.229  
Also, again similar to the REMS context, if the FDA becomes more 
conservative in its approval decisions, or more aggressive in exercising its 
withdrawal authority, the agency is likely to face political pressure. Indeed, in 
recent years, there have been instances of controversial drug approval and 
withdrawal decisions during which the FDA faced intense pressure. One 
example was the FDA’s 2016 decision to approve Exondys 51—a treatment for 
Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy—despite slim support for its efficacy, after 
patient advocates conducted a vigorous campaign in favor of the drug’s 
approval.230 As another example—and one in which the FDA made a decision 
different than the one sought by many patient advocates, some of whom 
protested outside the agency—in 2011 the FDA withdrew approval of the breast 
cancer indication for Avastin after postapproval research failed to confirm a 
clinical benefit associated with its effect on a surrogate endpoint.231 With 
increased interest in patient-focused drug development (and sophisticated, 
sometimes industry-funded, patient advocacy organizations),232 such pressures 
are likely to increase, especially if the approval standard appears to become 
more difficult to satisfy. 
                                                                                                                     
 228 Cf. Grossman, supra note 192, at 630 (describing patients’ desire for choice); Scott 
Gottlieb, Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Opening Remarks for Part 15 Public Meeting 
on Generic Drug Competition (July 18, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/ 
Speeches/ucm567323.htm [https://perma.cc/P6VV-T8WD] (discussing the role of competition 
in drug pricing). 
 229 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.430 (2015). 
 230 See, e.g., Matthew Herper, Approving a Muscular Dystrophy Drug Ignites a Civil 
War at the FDA, FORBES (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/ 
2016/09/20/approving-a-muscular-dystrophy-drug-ignites-civil-war-at-the-fda/#5d1e10 
5572a8 [https://perma.cc/MN74-ZJBQ]. 
 231 See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Revokes Approval of Avastin for Use as Breast 
Cancer Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/19/business/ 
fda-revokes-approval-of-avastin-as-breast-cancer-drug.html [https://perma.cc/8GFR-ETLY]. 
 232 See, e.g., Matthew S. McCoy et al., Conflicts of Interest for Patient-Advocacy 
Organizations, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 880, 880–82 (2017); Susannah L. Rose et al., Patient 
Advocacy Organizations, Industry Funding, and Conflicts of Interest, 177 JAMA INTERNAL 
MED. 344, 345 (2017); The Voice of the Patient: A Series of Reports from FDA’s Patient-
Focused Drug Development Initiative, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 3, 2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/forindustry/userfees/prescriptiondruguserfee/ucm368342.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4YQA-QUGS].  
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B. Other Consequences: The Example of New Tobacco Product 
Approval 
Expanded protection for off-label promotion also could affect FDA 
regulation outside of the prescription drug context, as well as outside of the 
medical products context altogether. This is because the First Amendment 
protections that may result in broader promotion of prescription drugs, likewise, 
may lead to broader promotion of other FDA-regulated products than FDA 
policies might otherwise permit.233 FDA regulation of tobacco products—and 
in particular Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems (ENDS), a popular novel 
tobacco technology that includes e-cigarettes—may provide one example of 
how such expanded product promotion might affect FDA regulation of a non-
medical product.234 This Part begins to undertake an exploration of what those 
effects might be in this context, albeit a preliminary exploration because the 
FDA’s jurisdiction over ENDS is relatively new and experience with how the 
FDA will exercise its authority over ENDS is limited. 
The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 amended 
the FDCA to authorize the FDA to regulate tobacco products. Among other 
things, it created an FDA approval process for “new tobacco products,” which 
include “any tobacco product . . . that was not commercially marketed in the 
United States as of February 15, 2007.”235 Because most ENDS have entered 
the U.S. market more recently than 2007, many ENDS will be new tobacco 
products required to undergo the FDA’s premarket review process.236 To obtain 
an order from the FDA authorizing marketing under a premarket tobacco 
product application (PMTA), a company must demonstrate to the FDA that 
“permitting [its] tobacco product to be marketed would be appropriate for the 
protection of the public health.”237 The statute further specifies that the FDA 
will make this public health determination  
                                                                                                                     
 233 See infra notes 243–44 and accompanying text. 
 234 This Article focuses only on those ENDS that meet the definition of tobacco products 
under the law. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(rr) (2012). Some ENDS may not be tobacco products. 
ENDS marketed for therapeutic purposes—for example, for smoking cessation—or ENDS 
that deliver synthetic nicotine not derived from tobacco may be drugs, devices, or drug-
device combination products under the FDCA. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g), (h); Sottera, Inc. v. 
FDA, 627 F.3d 891, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Patricia J. Zettler et al., Closing the Regulatory 
Gap for Synthetic Nicotine, 59 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (on file with author). 
 235 21 U.S.C. § 387j(a)(1); Deeming Tobacco Products To Be Subject to the FDCA, 81 
Fed. Reg. 28,974 (May 10, 2016) (to be codified at 21 CFR pts. 1100, 1140, and 1143).  
 236 See 81 Fed. Reg. 28,974, 28,976. 
 237 21 U.S.C. § 387j(c)(2)(A). The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control 
Act also created a “substantial equivalence” pathway for obtaining the FDA’s authorization 
to market new tobacco products. Id. § 387j(a)(3). This pathway is available to products that 
have the same characteristics as a “predicate” tobacco product, or that have different 
characteristics but do not raise “different questions of public health.” Id. Products that may 
be used as predicates are those that were legally marketed in the United States as of February 
15, 2007, or those that go through the substantial equivalence pathway to obtain marketing 
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with respect to the risks and benefits to the population as a whole, 
including users and nonusers of the tobacco product, and taking 
into account— 
(A) the increased or decreased likelihood that existing users of tobacco 
products will stop using such products; and  
(B) the increased or decreased likelihood that those who do not use 
tobacco products will start using such products.238  
 
There is little experience with how the FDA will implement this “public 
health” standard for PMTAs for various reasons. The FDA, thus far, has issued 
marketing orders for only eight new tobacco products under this standard.239 
Additionally, it was not until 2016 that the FDA deemed many novel tobacco 
technologies, such as ENDS, to be subject to the premarket approval 
requirement.240 Moreover, the FDA does not intend to enforce premarket review 
requirements for many current ENDS until 2022.241 Nevertheless it is clear that 
the standard for issuing a PMTA marketing order requires the FDA to weigh 
product risks and benefits, broadly conceived to include the risks and benefits 
to both users and nonusers of the product.  
                                                                                                                     
authorization. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF: 
SECTION 905(J) REPORTS: DEMONSTRATING SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE FOR TOBACCO 
PRODUCTS 4 (Jan. 2011), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/ 
Labeling/RulesRegulationsGuidance/UCM239021.pdf [https://perma.cc/LSZ8-Z2GB]. Because 
ENDS products were not generally marketed in the United States as of February 2007, it is 
unlikely that ENDS manufacturers will be able to make use of the substantial equivalence 
pathway to marketing. For that reason, this Article focuses on the standard for approval for 
PMTAs. 
 238 21 U.S.C. § 387j(c)(4). 
 239 Tobacco Product Marketing Orders, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 8, 2017), 
http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/TobaccoProductReviewEvaluation/ucm339
928.htm [https://perma.cc/P59S-9LYS]. All eight approved products are versions of Swedish 
Match North America’s smokeless tobacco, “Snus.” See Premarket Tobacco Product 
Marketing Orders, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 10, 2015), 
http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/TobaccoProductReviewEvaluation/ucm472
108.htm [https://perma.cc/A6W7-RVWM]. 
 240 See Deeming Tobacco Products To Be Subject to the FDCA, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,974, 
28,984 (May 10, 2016) (to be codified at 21 CFR pts. 1100, 1140, and 1143).  
 241 In a July 2017 statement the FDA announced that it would not enforce the 
requirement for premarket review until 2022 for ENDS products that were on the U.S. market 
as of August 2016. See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Announces 
Comprehensive Regulatory Plan To Shift Trajectory of Tobacco-Related Disease, Death 
(July 28, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ 
ucm568923.htm [https://perma.cc/RKX7-6HL2]. For compliance dates for ENDS products 
that first entered the market after August 2016, see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY: EXTENSION OF CERTAIN TOBACCO PRODUCT COMPLIANCE DEADLINES 
RELATED TO THE FINAL DEEMING RULE (Aug. 2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
TobaccoProducts/Labeling/RulesRegulationsGuidance/UCM557716.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTR4-
YZ8Z].  
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Although there are many open questions about the risks and benefits of 
ENDS for users and exposed nonusers, and the FDA will evaluate the merits of 
each product individually, researchers have suggested that we can draw a few 
general conclusions. Mainly, ENDS appear to be less harmful than traditional 
cigarettes, but also addictive, more harmful than no nicotine or tobacco exposure 
at all would be, and, so far, of uncertain value for influencing smokers to reduce 
or quit their cigarette consumption.242 This suggests that in a marketing order 
analysis, the FDA might consider whether a specific ENDS product has 
attributes making it likely to be used by current smokers as a less harmful means 
of using nicotine, which would be a public health benefit. The FDA might also 
consider whether an ENDS product is likely to initiate tobacco and nicotine use 
among nonsmokers, which would pose a public health risk.  
One way to assure the FDA that the smoking reduction benefits of an ENDS 
might be maximized, and the initiation risks minimized, would be to limit 
advertising either to current smokers (or a subset of current smokers) or to 
restrict the content of advertising in some way to encourage smokers to use the 
ENDS as a cigarette replacement.243 In addition to potentially shaping the 
benefits of the products, ENDS product promotion could increase risks 
associated with the products, particularly in light of the evidence that tobacco 
marketing can be quite effective at initiating tobacco use among adolescents and 
young adults.244 The FDA’s benefit–risk evaluation of new tobacco products, 
as with drugs, thus might be shaped by how products are promoted and the 
agency’s ability to oversee that promotion.  
To the extent the First Amendment allows, the FDCA expressly authorizes 
the FDA to restrict tobacco product advertising and promotion to protect the 
public health.245 In light of the fact that the FDA has had some success in 
defending the restrictions on tobacco product promotion imposed in the FDCA, 
the FDA may be better positioned to enforce restrictions on the promotion of 
approved tobacco products than it is to enforce its policies related to off-label 
promotion of drugs. For example, the FDCA requires that the FDA authorize 
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marketing for “modified risk tobacco products”—those products accompanied 
by claims that they reduce the harms associated with tobacco products—and, 
relying on Central Hudson, the Sixth Circuit concluded that requirement, on its 
face, did not violate the First Amendment.246 Additionally, if the FDA decided 
to restrict ENDS advertising to certain audiences (e.g., ENDS companies may 
only market to current smokers, but may say whatever they wish in that 
marketing), such restrictions, if imposed, may not be construed as content-based 
restrictions subject to heightened scrutiny.247 Finally, as practical matters, the 
long and well-known history of misleading tobacco advertising in the United 
States, and the agency’s explicit statutory authority to restrict tobacco product 
promotion for public health reasons, may make courts more sympathetic to FDA 
regulation than they are in the drug context.248 
Nevertheless, Caronia and its progeny may raise concerns that once the 
FDA permits a new tobacco product to enter the market, restrictions on 
advertising and promotion may be struck down when they are applied to specific 
claims that courts deem to be truthful and non-misleading promotion. Given 
scientific uncertainty about the risks and benefits of ENDS products,249 ENDS 
manufacturers may be able to craft marketing campaigns that, like Amarin’s 
promotion of Vascepta, are deemed truthful and non-misleading by a court but 
nevertheless pose public health concerns.250 Moreover, as in the drug context, 
the fact that a company may promise at the time the FDA issues a marketing 
order to limit its product promotion is not likely to be helpful. It would be 
challenging for the agency to enforce such a commitment.251  
To the extent that the FDA faces difficulty in enforcing promotion 
restrictions after new tobacco products enter the market, the FDA, thus, may 
more conservatively exercise its authority to issue, or more aggressively 
exercise its authority to withdraw,252 tobacco product marketing orders. The 
practical effect would be the same as for drugs—fewer products on the market 
than there might otherwise be—and this outcome may not be a desirable one for 
the public health. Smoking remains the leading cause of preventable death in 
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the United States, causing roughly 480,000 deaths per year.253 If the potential 
harm reduction benefits of ENDS and other novel tobacco products can be 
realized, such products could have a significant, positive impact on the public 
health by reducing smoking-related death and disease, and fewer products on 
the market may lessen that impact. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article suggests that the impact of recently recognized protections for 
off-label promotion—even if limited to what courts deem to be truthful and non-
misleading promotion about approved products—could affect FDA oversight 
outside of its product-promotion regulatory regimes. This effect is not limited 
to the context of medical products. Broader product promotion may alter any 
FDA regulatory decisions that involve weighing product risks and benefits, at 
least at the margins, because such promotion may increase the risks associated 
with the products. This, in turn, may lead to more limited access to FDA-
regulated products, which is not likely to be a desirable outcome for any 
stakeholders.  
Although an undesirable policy outcome cannot trump protections for off-
label promotion grounded in the First Amendment, there may be creative, 
practical steps that the FDA and other stakeholders could take to mitigate 
potential indirect effects of off-label use. One possibility is that the FDA could 
explore ways that it might cooperate with other stakeholders that influence how 
drugs are used to mitigate the risks of unsupported off-label uses.254 Perhaps 
most obviously, health insurers are stakeholders that can shape how prescription 
drugs are used—if insurers will not pay for particular uses, those uses are likely 
to be reduced or eliminated.255 Moreover, regardless of the steps that the FDA 
and other stakeholders might take, this Article may provide another reason for 
courts to take seriously the government’s position that it has a substantial 
interest in regulating off-label promotion, and to give that interest significant 
weight in First Amendment analyses. 
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